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This project focuses on information processing in policy subsystems, specifically 
how congressional committees in the domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy areas 
prioritize available information, with an extended analysis of information supply and 
prioritization in energy policy.  I examine the conditions under which federal bureaucrats are 
most likely to supply information to Congress in these three policy areas.  I seek to determine 
whether and to what extent the bureaucratic supply of information changes by issue area, 
presiding congressional committee, and in response to problem uncertainty.  My findings suggest 
that the number of bureaucrats testifying varies by both policy area and committee type.  
Furthermore, as the problem uncertainty for a committee increases, so too does the number of 
federal bureaucrats invited to testify.  These findings are especially true for careerist bureaucrats.  
Within energy policy, my findings show that the subsystem actors most likely to supply 
information at a hearing varies across committees, over time, and by specific issue area.  By 
examining who supplies information, this project will provide a better understanding of how 
subsystem actors are prioritized by congressional committees as information suppliers.  This 
study is important because the information supplied by these non-elected policy elites can then 
influence the problem definition process, structure policy debates, and impact policy formulation.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2007, there was a general agreement among members of Congress and the 
president that energy independence was, indeed, a crucial problem facing the United 
States (Pierce 2007; Hall 2007; Neal 2007).  However, there was much disagreement 
over the most salient dimensions of the energy problem.  There was a divide in Congress 
over how to approach energy independence, whether the lack of conservation, low 
production, or low variability of available fuels was at the root of the problem (Landrieu 
2007; Shimkus 2007).   
Congress needed information to decide how to more clearly define the 
problem—energy independence defined as an independence from foreign oil or energy 
independence defined as an independence from fossil fuels more generally.  Largely, 
Democrats pushed more for the latter while President Bush and Republicans in Congress 
pushed more for the former (Pierce 2007; Hall 2007; Neal 2007). 
Subsystem actors were very eager to supply information to Congress in an effort 
to sway the definition in one direction or the other.   Many states and municipalities 
were pushing more for energy independence to be defined as an independence from 
fossil fuels generally (McConnell and Sanchez 2007; Sanchez 2007 (1); Sanchez 2007 
(4); Sanchez 2007 (3)).  Many coastal states, Florida in particular, were worried that a 
move to produce more oil in the U.S. would lead to an increase in drilling in the Outer 
Continental Shelf, potentially interfering with their important tourism industries (Nelson 
2006; Davis 2006).  In addition, municipalities were in favor of energy independence as 
a move away from fossil fuels in effort to take advantage of potential federal subsidies 
for producing electricity from alternative and renewable fuels (McConnell and Sanchez 
2007; Sanchez 2007 (4); Sanchez 2007 (1)). 
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In contrast, Republicans and American oil companies and petroleum 
manufacturers were pushing to define energy independence as independence from 
foreign oil (“Energy Overhaul…” 2007; “Twenty in Ten…” 2007).  These groups were 
in favor of keeping then-current government subsidies for exploration as well as 
increasing the areas available for potential exploration, most notably the Outer 
Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (Talev 
2006; “Energy Overhaul…” 2007; “Twenty in Ten…” 2007). 
In many ways, the oil industry prevailed given that energy as independence from 
foreign oil seemed to carry the day.  Despite the efforts of some, oil companies 
maintained the status quo of approximately 20 billion dollars in government subsidies 
(Sanchez 2008).  While Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) did not 
open new areas for oil exploration, there were no additional restrictions placed.  
Municipalities, in contrast, were unsuccessful in convincing Congress that the problem 
of energy independence should be defined as independence from fossil fuels.  Congress 
dropped the addition of a subsidy program for the promotion of electricity produced by 
alternative and renewable fuels from the legislation (Sanchez 2007 (2)). 
The pluralistic theory of information suggests that businesses, interest groups, 
bureaucrats, and other actors will compete to supply information to Congress in an effort 
to define or redefine problems and, ultimately, influence the policy making process 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005).  This competition to supply information creates an oversupply of information 
available, requiring Congress to prioritize the information rather than searching for it 
(Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  The above example from the EISA 2007 shows 
there are clear winners and losers at multiple points in information processing.  Not 
everyone who wanted to provide Congress with information regarding EISA was able.  
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Some sources of information, such as states and oil companies, were able to successfully 
communicate their problem definitions to Congress and attempt to steer the debate.  As 
evident from the final bill, not all of the information that was shared with Congress was 
applied to the legislation—municipalities, for example, were unable to effectively steer 
the policy debate.  This project seeks to understand what determines who is able to gain 
access to provide information to Congress.  Only those sources of information receiving 
attention from Congress (ex. invited to testify at committee hearings) have the 
opportunity to shape problem definitions and, thus, the policy process.  
This dissertation is composed of five substantive chapters.  The first, Chapter 
Two, reviews the policy dynamics of information processing, reviewing two popular 
theories of information processing: classic economic theory and pluralistic theory.  The 
pluralistic theory of information suggests an oversupply of information resulting from 
competition among actors attempting to define the problem for policymakers (Simon 
1983; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005).  By defining the problem, an actor can steer policy debates, 
structure solutions in their favor, and have a major impact on the policy process 
(Kingdon 1984; Edleman 1964; Stone 1989).  Based on this theory, Chapter Two 
suggests there are three parts to information processing: supply, prioritization, and 
application.  The supply of information is just that, actors competing to supply 
information to Congress.  The prioritization requires congressional committees to decide 
which sources of information to attend (and invite to testify) and which to ignore.  The 
application is the process in which Congress decides which of the prioritized 
information is applied to the policy making process.     
Building on the previous chapter, Chapter Three introduces a new approach to 
information prioritization or how Congress deals with the oversupply of available 
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information.  The new approach to information prioritization introduced here suggests 
that how congressional committees decide which sources of information to attend and 
which to ignore is determined by three factors: policy characteristics, committee goals, 
and problem uncertainty.   
Policy areas differ in three important ways.  First, the number of dimensions that 
characterize an issue area differ from one issue to the next (see Jochim and Jones 2013).  
Some policy areas are more accurately characterized by a single ideological dimension, 
such as health care policy.  Other policy areas like energy, though, are more accurately 
characterized by multiple dimensions, including ideology and constituency and regional 
preferences (Jochim and Jones 2013).  Second, the arenas in which policy making takes 
place varies from issue to issue.   Change in health care policy is likely to occur via 
legislative enactment; whereas, changes in energy policy are most likely to be 
administratively driven (Grossman 2013).  Third, the groups that are active in the policy 
making process vary from one issue area to another.  Policies with publics have an 
active, diverse set of actors involved in policy making; whereas, policies without publics 
have a much more limited set of actors, many of which are technical or scientific experts 
(May 1991). These differences in policy areas are reflected in the information 
prioritization process because the preferred sources of information, the necessary 
sources of information, and the available sources of information can vary from one issue 
to another depending on whether the policy area is best characterized by a single 
ideological dimension, the arena in which policy change occurs, and whether the policy 
area has an active public.  
The second factor that influences the information prioritization process of 
congressional committees is the shared goal of the committee.  As Fenno (1973) first 
pointed out, members of Congress self-select onto congressional committees based on 
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their top priorities: constituency service, making good public policy, or power and 
prestige within the chamber.  The result is that each committee shares one of these goals.  
The shared goal of a committee then leads to committees preferring those sources of 
information which can best facilitate goal achievement.  Constituency committees prefer 
those sources of information (constituents, businesses, and interest groups) that allow 
members to be best informed on the needs and preferences of their constituents.  
Members of policy committees prefer information from partisan coalition (interest 
groups and fellow members of Congress) to provide information that will reinforce 
policy preferences.  Power committees tend to prefer information from elite information 
sources (presidentially appointed bureaucrats and fellow members of Congress) that 
reinforce their power within the chamber.  It is important to note that this project is 
focused on institutional information processing, which requires looking at the 
committees as a whole.   Individual members of the committees may prefer different 
specific sources of information that reflect their personal ideological or constituencies’ 
preferences, but the committee as a whole will have a shared preference  for types of 
information sources: interest groups, states and localities, businesses, members of 
Congress, or bureaucrats.   
The third factor that influences committee information prioritization is problem 
uncertainty.  Problem uncertainty is defined as when a congressional committee is 
unsure about the nature of the problem or which attribute of a problem is the most 
important. The best way to alleviate problem uncertainty is with accurate, reliable, and 
stable information.  Bureaucrats are the most capable of supplying information that 
meets this criteria given that they are created by law to gather policy information, have 
long-term, repeated interactions with congressional committees, and have relatively long 
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shelf-lives.  As the problem uncertainty of a committee increases, so too will the number 
of bureaucrats invited to testify at hearings.   
The dataset used to understand how policy area, committee goals, and problem 
uncertainty affect information prioritization is the most extensive of its kind.  All 4,745 
congressional committee hearings on domestic commerce, energy, and health care 
policy areas from 1995-2010 were collected.  Each hearing was then coded for policy 
area, committee type, problem uncertainty, and several control variables.  Then, all 
33,090 witnesses testifying at those hearings were collected and coded according to 
which institution type each represented.  The result is an expansive dataset coded to 
incredible detail.  For instance, federal bureaucrats are coded not just as bureaucrats, but 
also according to their appointments (ex. careerist or presidentially appointed) as well as 
agency type (ex. defense, energy, land and agriculture).  Businesses are coded according 
to size and their specific industry.  Businesses with one thousand or more employees are 
coded as large businesses; whereas, those with less than one thousand employees were 
coded as small businesses.  Businesses were additionally coded for the industry in which 
they are active.  The dataset is used to track congressional committee attention to major 
witness types and to these more specific witness types.  The analyses presented in the 
later chapters of this dissertation is only the beginning of the possibilities for this 
dataset.    
The new approach to information prioritization is addressed by four main 
questions analyzed in Chapters Four through Six.  The first, most broad question is how 
does the information preferences of congressional committees vary by policy area, 
committee goals, and the presence of problem uncertainty?  The findings in these three 
chapters suggests that all three factors: policy characteristics, committee goals, and 
problem uncertainty influences which sources of information are prioritized at a given 
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committee hearing.  The second question, which addresses whether federal bureaucrats 
have an advantage in the information supply process given their unique characteristics 
and relationships with Congress, is most directly analyzed in Chapter Four, but there is 
some additional supporting evidence in the other chapters.  The findings suggest that as 
congressional committees become more uncertain about a problem, they invite more 
bureaucrats to testify at hearings.  Policy characteristics and committee type also appear 
to influence how congressional committee prioritize bureaucrats as sources of 
information.  The final two chapters both address the remaining questions: How do 
congressional committees make tradeoffs between sources of information when engaged 
in information prioritization? And, when do non-bureaucrats appear to have an 
advantage in information processing? Chapter Five primarily focuses on when private 
witnesses (interest groups and businesses) are most likely to testify at energy policy 
hearings.  Chapter Six, though, looks at when public witnesses are most likely to be 
prioritized as sources of information at energy hearings.  The findings from these two 
chapters suggest that policy characteristics of issue areas within energy have a major 
influence on who is invited to testify.  Those issue areas with publics are likely to have 
more businesses, interest groups, and states and localities testifying.  Those issue areas 
without publics, though, are much more likely to have increased numbers of federal 
bureaucrats testifying.  In addition these two chapters reinforce the finding that problem 
uncertainty leads congressional committees to invite more federal bureaucrats to testify.   
In short, the goal of this dissertation is to explore the pluralistic theory of 
information processing and apply it to information processing in policy subsystems and, 
by doing so, present a new approach to studying information prioritization by 
congressional committees.  The key question here is, how does information 
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prioritization at congressional committee hearings vary by policy area, committee type, 
and the presence of problem uncertainty? 
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Chapter 2: Policy Dynamics of Information Processing 
There are two popular approaches in political science to studying information 
processing: the classic economic theory of information and the pluralistic theory of 
information processing.  The first is most popular in institutional studies and emphasizes 
the limited and costly nature of information (See Stigler 1961 and Mitnick 1975).  
According to the classic economic theory, information is scare and Congress must use 
incentives to solicit information from potential information suppliers.  The second 
approach, the pluralistic theory of information, is popular in policy process studies and 
suggests a very different scenario in which information is overabundant with actors 
competing to supply information in an effort to affect policy.  Congress is not tasked 
with searching for or soliciting information, but rather filtering and prioritizing it.   
These two theories run parallel to one another.  The pluralistic framework 
suggests the policy the policy space is multidimensional and messy with actors 
competing to help define the problem, structure debates, and influence the policy-
making process.  Classic economic theory suggests a well-defined policy space with 
actors withholding information to ensure power and control in an issue area.  The 
differences between the two theories and the subsequent implications for information 
processing will be discussed in great detail in this chapter.   
The following sections of this chapter review the information processing 
literature and advocate for the pluralistic explanation of information supply.  The 
pluralistic approach to information processing suggests an oversupply of information 
exists in policy making as a result of political elites competing to define policy 
problems.  By subscribing to this pluralistic theory of information supply, the focus on 
information processing is on the prioritization of information rather than on the search 
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for information.  The question of interest then is, how do policymakers choose which 
information providers receive attention and which are ignored? 
The rest of the chapter is comprised of three sections.  The first section defines 
information in the policy-making process and summarizes the existing literature on 
information processing, arguing for the accuracy of the pluralistic perspective in 
describing the problem definition process.  The next section argues for the 
appropriateness of policy subsystems for studying information processing and the final 
section discusses the three components of information processing: supply, prioritization, 
and applicationand the motivations of actors therein.   
INFORMATION PROCESSING: A REVIEW 
Understanding how information impacts the policy-making process is important 
for three reasons.  First, information is a necessary ingredient in the public policy 
process.  Policymakers, such as members of Congress, need information regarding the 
salience and definition of problems (Kingdon 1981; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; 
Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005), possible effects of solutions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Burstein and Hirsh 2007), as well as re-election consequences for officeholders (Hansen 
1991; Burstein and Hirsh 2007).  
Second, according the pluralistic perspective of information, bureaucrats and 
interest groups share information in an effort to define policy problems and steer policy 
debates.  How a problem is defined structures the debate surrounding said policy, 
including which dimensions of the problem are deemed most relevant.  Solutions, then, 
are formulated in response to the problem definition.   
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Prior to the Three Mile Island accident in March of 1979, in which a nuclear 
reactor suffered from a partial meltdown, nuclear energy was defined as technological 
advancement and sound economics (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).  The Three Mile 
Island combined with an influx of scientific evidence of the environmental degradation 
associated with nuclear waste prompted a shift in the problem definition of nuclear 
energy.  Nuclear energy post-Three Mile Island has been largely defined in terms of 
dangers to both humans and the environment posed by potential accidents and nuclear 
waste.  With the change in definitions came a change in the available solutions.   
In the decade prior to Three Mile, on average five new nuclear reactors became 
operational each year, effectively tripling the number of reactors in the United States 
(EIA 2015).  In the five years following the meltdown, there was only an average of two 
new reactors each year (EIA 2015).  No longer was expansion of nuclear energy in the 
United States highly prioritized as a solution.  In fact, 2012 was the first time since 
before the Three Mile accident that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the 
construction of a new reactor plant (Abernethy 2012).  Solutions since the early 1980s 
have shifted to focus on waste clean-up and storage, brownfield reclamation, and 
disaster prevention, all of which reflect the new problem definition (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991).  In fact, many of the biggest debates in energy in the mid to late 1990s 
revolved around these points. 1  
Third, according to the pluralistic perspective of information, an oversupply of 
information will exist in the problem definition process requiring policy makers to 
prioritize that information, attending to some sources of information while ignoring 
others.  Prioritization of information is necessary given the attention limits of 
                                                 
1 A major point of contention in energy policy in the mid to late 1990s concerned radioactive waste 
storages, specifically at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (see “Plan…” 1995; “Nevada…” 1998).   
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policymakers (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005 and Jones 2001).  Attention limits mean 
policymakers can only attend to a finite number of policy problems at any particular 
time.  Further, policymakers can only attend to a finite number of information sources in 
regards to a given policy. 
This prioritization allows some political elites, such as bureaucrats and interest 
groups, to direct debate while others are relegated to the sidelines.  Prioritization of 
information results in some sources of information being granted attention from 
policymakers while denying it to other sources.  Those political elites that garner 
attention are more likely to define problems and direct debates (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984).  
In the nuclear energy example, it was not necessarily that new information from 
environmental scientists was suddenly available that influenced a new problem 
definition.  Rather, environmental scientists suddenly became more likely to be 
prioritized as sources of nuclear energy information by policymakers (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991).  Policymakers were paying attention to environmental scientists’ concerns, 
which allowed them to influence the direction of the debate.   
There are two broad theories of information supply—the classic economic theory 
of limited information (Stigler 1961) and the pluralistic theory of information common 
to the public policy literature (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  The classic economic theory is most common 
in institutional studies, specifically in the principal-agent literature (see Mitnick 1975).  
The pluralistic theory, though, is most prevalent in the describing problem definition and 
agenda-setting processes.  
The clear separation between the application of the classic economic theory and 
that of the pluralistic theory is due to differences in context, availability and generation 
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of information, respective definitions of information, as well as the types of search 
employed by policy makers in the two scenarios.  The following sections will review the 
key differences between the two theories, which are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: The Characteristics of the Pluralistic Theory of Information and Classic 
Economic Theory of Information 
 
At first glance, the two theories of information seem contradictory.  The 
economic theory claims that information is limited and difficult to obtain.  The 
pluralistic theory of information, though, suggests an overabundance of available 
information.  The theories do not, in fact, contradict one another because they describe 
two separate contexts.  The economic theory describes information in the solution space, 
whereas, the pluralistic theory describes information in the problem space.   
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Information in the Problem Space 
In policy debates, problems and solutions are often thrown together, sometimes 
even used interchangeably.  Analytically, though, it is helpful to separate problems and 
the problem definition process from solutions and the process of identifying viable 
solutions.  Newell and Simon (1972) contend that decisions can be broken down into 
two parts—the construction and definition of a problem and the identification of 
alternative solutions.  The problem space is characterized by multidimensional problems 
that are messy and undefined. Decision makers must determine what the problem is or 
which dimensions of the problem are most important. 
This winnowing of problems is often referred to as problem definition or the 
process through which a phenomenon is labeled as not only a problem, but one that 
deserves the government’s attention (Kingdon 1984; Edleman 1964; Stone 1989).  
Problem definition can also be conceived as the process through which policymakers 
identify which dimension of a problem is in greatest need of government intervention 
(see Dery 1984 and Jones 1994).  In the first conception of problem definition, 
policymakers may identify homeland security as a problem the government should 
address.  The second conception of problem definition is best illustrated in the EISA 
2007 example.  It was generally agreed upon that energy was a problem, but 
policymakers had to determine which of the many dimensions of energy policy should 
receive government attention, such as low U.S. oil production or too high a dependence 
on fossil fuels. 
How a problem is defined not only steers the debate surrounding that particular 
problem, but also determines which solutions could be considered in the future.  
Looking back at EISA 2007, had the problem in energy been defined in terms of an 
independence from fossil fuels, subsidies for alternative and renewable fuels would 
 15 
likely have taken greater precedent as a possible solution.  However, the problem in 
energy was defined in terms of low oil production in the United States and a need for 
independence from foreign oil.  With this definition of the energy problem, subsidies for 
alternative and renewable fuels because less appropriate than policies to increase U.S. 
oil production.  The ability to direct debate in this way is the driving force behind actors, 
such as interest groups, bureaucracies, and state and local governments, supplying 
information. 
How a problem is defined structures which solutions can or cannot be considered 
later in the policy process (Stone 1989; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
According to the pluralistic theory of information, the ability of an actor to structure the 
debates and solutions surrounding a problem in his or her favor promotes competition to 
supply information to policymakers. Political and economic elites such as federal 
bureaucrats, interest groups, businesses, and state and local governments, compete to 
supply information to help policymakers define problems (Simon 1983; Workman, 
Jones, and Jochim 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgarnter 2005).  
An actor will decline to withhold information for fear that a competitor will gain an 
advantage by supplying informaiton in his or her stead.   
This competition to supply information results in an oversupply of information 
available to policymakers (Simon 1983; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  The 
oversupply of information is noisy and chaotic (Baumgartner and Jones 2015), with an 
infinite number of information suppliers each providing different evidence to further his 
or her own policy goals.   To complicate matters more, the available information is often 
times contradictory.  In the case of EISA 2007, some information suppliers were arguing 
that the energy independence problem should be defined as an independence from fossil 
fuels.  Other, though, provided information that suggested the energy problem was 
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actually one of low U.S. oil production.  These two streams of information would 
seemingly push policy in opposite directions.  
Information in the pluralistic framework of information processing is most 
frequently discussed in terms of the dimensions of an agenda or policy area (see 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993).   Often particular focus is placed on scientific and technical 
expertise regarding both the problem and the politics of the problem.  Information as 
technical expertise can be divided into two categories: policy and political (see Leyden 
1995).  Policy information refers to the problem itself and is directly relatable to the 
specific issue(s) at hand (Leyden 1995).  Current (or estimates of future) unemployment 
and inflation rates are examples of policy information necessary for defining 
macroeconomic policy problems.  Political information, in contrast, pertains to the 
political and, more importantly perhaps, electoral consequences of action or inaction in 
regards to a given problem.  Public opinion is an example of political information 
(Leyden 1995).  Policy makers require both policy and political information when 
making public policy because they need to understand the practical and political impacts 
of (in)action.  In this dissertation, information broadly refers to information as technical 
expertise.     
Information in the Solution Space 
The solution space provides an entirely different context for the generation of 
information because the challenge of narrowing down the relevant dimensions of the 
problem has already been solved.  Well-defined problems with few dimensions 
characterize the solution space.  Policymakers know what the problem is, have identified 
the most relevant attributes of the problem, and have a narrow (and generally accepted) 
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list of solutions and agents tasked with implementation.  Nuclear energy policy prior to 
1979 provides a great example of solution-space politics.  The policy area was well-
defined in term so technological advancement and sound economics.  The generally 
agreed upon solution was an expansion of the nuclear energy capacity of the U.S., with 
the number of reactors tripling over the previous decade.  Likewise, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission was accepted as the most capable agent of nuclear energy 
regulation.2 
Whereas the goal of an actor in the problem space is to supply information in 
hopes of defining a problem and structuring the relevant debates in his or her favor; 
actors in the solution space are focused on maintaining control and ensuring favorable 
outcomes.  The principal-agent literature illustrates these struggles over control and 
outcomes in the solution space (see Mitnick 1975).  In studies focusing on the control of 
the bureaucracy, information usually refers to the preferences and biases of agents 
relating to alternatives.  In the second context, information pertains to the relationship 
between the solution and its outcomes.   
Because information is used to control agents and ensure outcomes, supply 
patterns are different in the solution space.  When seeking power over a policy area and 
avoiding principal control, agents are reluctant to share information.  In 2002, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President Bush issued rule proposals to 
relax some important pollution controls in the Clean Air Act.  The EPA was, in effect, 
claiming the power to change clean air policy. When challenged by members of 
Congress, the EPA refused to offer information to support the changes to policy 
                                                 
2 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to replace 
the Atomic Energy Commission (www.nrc.gov).  The Commission was tasked with nuclear energy 
regulation, including reactor safety, plant siting, and materials; whereas, the Department of Energy was 
assigned the role of regulating nuclear weapons.   
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(“Jeffords…” 2002; Hulse 2002).  In an effort to regain control of the agency and the 
policy area Congress, specifically the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, demanded more information regarding the policy changes.  Senators 
Jeffords (I-VT) and Lieberman (D-CT) went so far as to threaten to subpoena the EPA 
to obtain the information (“Jeffords…” 2002).  The subpoena represents an effort by the 
principal to incentivize the agent to supply information.  The threat of the subpoena 
provoked a series of promises from the EPA to provide said information, but little 
more.3  Clearly information in the solution space is both more limited and costly than 
that in the problem space.   
In principal-agent models, the reluctance to share information results in two 
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard (see Brehm and Gates 1999).  Adverse 
selection describes a situation in which athe principal is unsure whih agent is the 
appropriate agent for a particular job.  Moral hazard describes the inability of a principal 
to fully monitor and know the actions as well as true preferences of the agent.  The 
solution space assumes that the first problem, adverse selection, is no longer an issue 
because the implementing agent has already been chosen.  Moral hazard, though, 
remains a problem the principal must contend with.  Information about the agents’ 
preferences and the releationships between solutions and outcomes offer principal a way 
to combat moral hazard as evidenced by the EPA example above. 
Rather than agents sharing information voluntarily and in a competitive manner, 
the classic economic theory of information suggests that agents will withhold 
information.  The reluctance of agents to share information means that information 
sharing in the solution space is instead incentive-based (see McCubbins, Noll and 
                                                 
3 The EPA never followed through with providing the information to Congress, but Congress ultimately 
got what it was after a year later (October 22, 2003) when the Government Accounting Office issued a 
report on the entire process (http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/041001.asp). 
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Weingast 1987 and 1989).  Incentive-based information is characterized by principals 
inducing agents to share private information about their preferences, biases, and policy 
outcomes.  For example, Congress can use administrative procedures as a mechanism 
for incentivizing agency behavior (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).  Through the 
use of administrative procedures Congress can require the collection and dissemination 
of policy relevant information.  By stacking the deck in their favor, Congress is able to 
shape the incentive structure for agencies in the solution space (McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1987 and 1989).  Further, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that 
Congress can ensure that interest groups and citizens have the power to provide 
additional oversight and incentives for ensuring agency compliance.  Not only is 
information in the solution space limited, but the creation of these incentive structures 
means that it is also costly. 
Searching for Information 
Classic economic theory accurately describes information processing in the 
solution space given the limited information present and the costs associated with 
incentivizing actors to reveal private information.  It is also clear that the pluralistic 
theory of information, which claims an oversupply of information due to competition, is 
most accurate in describing the problem space.  According to these two theories, how 
policymakers search for information is going to vary wildly between these two 
scenarios.  Recent work by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) suggests that when the 
dimensions of a problem are low and the problem is well-defined, as expected in 
solution-space politics, policymakers engage in a narrow, expert search.  Policymakers 
engaged in expert search can target and solicit information from actors they know to 
hold valuable information (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). 
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This narrow, expert search is possible for two important reasons.  First, much of 
the uncertainty surrounding the problem has been previously addressed in the problem 
space (Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  Policymakers know the problem and the most 
important aspect(s) of that problem, thereby winnowing proposed solutions and limiting 
the information necessary for decision making.  Second, the limited set of solutions 
being winnowed effectively narrows the list of actors involved (or potentially involved) 
in policy implementation (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Therefore, not only is the what 
(information) narrowed but so too is the who (potential information suppliers).  For 
example, policymakers operating in the nuclear energy solutions space have a relatively 
short list of federal agencies from which they can solicit pertinent information.  
The same narrow approach to gathering information would not be appropriate in 
the problem space. Problems tend to be messy and highly multidimensional.  They are 
often both new and not clearly defined.  The information supplied is just as likely to be 
messy, which we should expect of information supplied in a competitive and crowded 
atmosphere.  Therefore, a broad search is necessary to get a greater understanding of the 
available information and to account for possible biases and inaccuracies.  
The pluralistic theory of information suggests that policy makers need not search 
or solicit information so much as prioritize or filter the barrage of available information.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) call this entropic search.  Entropic search becomes 
necessary when problems are not well-defined.  Policymakers must look to a wider pool 
of information sources to identify potentially pertinent attributes of the problem 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  Entropic search, being so broad, potentially allows for 
an infinite number of willing information suppliers.  Policymakers engaged in entropic 
search are, therefore, prioritizing information sources rather than actively searching for 
information or incentivizing sources to supply it.  By prioritizing information, 
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policymakers must choose to attend to some sources of information while ignoring 
others.       
It is important to note that the problem space and solution space distinctions 
allow us to highlight differences in information processing in the policy process.  
However, a policy area is not necessarily contained in only one space.  Further, once an 
issue is defined and occupies the solution space, there is no guarantee that it will remain 
in that context.  Constant feedback in the political system (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) 
means that a policy is never permanently in one space or another.  Policy solutions are 
frequently reevaluated and redefined.  See Baumgartner and Jones (1991) work on 
nuclear energy.  Prior to 1979, nuclear energy was a well-defined policy area with a 
generally agreed upon set of potential solutions.  Like most issues, it was not 
permanently entrenched in the solution space.  As a result of the shock of the Three Mile 
Island accident and new information regarding the dangers of nuclear waste, the 
problem was no longer well-defined.  Nuclear energy policy was suddenly 
multidimensional and in need of redefinition in the problem space.     
At its core, this project is interested in information processing in the problem 
space.  As argued above, the pluralistic theory of information, which suggests the 
presence of an oversupply of information, is most appropriate for studying problems.  
The oversupply of information requires policymakers to prioritize some sources of 
information over others.  Frequently studies utilizing the pluralistic framework of 
information processing do so in the sub-government context (see Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  This project will 
continue that trend.   
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POLICY MAKING IN SUBSYSTEMS 
Policy subsystems are a great venue for studying information processing in the 
problem space.  Fundamentally, subsystems are information processors, which are best 
understood with regards to the supply of information and the prioritization of 
information (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  Policy subsystems consist of issue-
specific experts from three sources: congressional committees with jurisdiction, relevant 
bureaucracies, and vested interest groups (Freeman 1965; Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 
Thurber 1991; Thurber 1996; McCool 1998).  A textbook example of a subsystem 
would look like Figure 1, with the House Committee on Natural Resources, Department 
of Energy, and the American Gas Association.  Information, depicted by the dark 
arrows, is shared amongst the actors.   
As Thurber (1996) points out, a subsystem can also be conceived as an open 
communication network in which interest groups, bureaucracies, and congressional 
committees share valuable information.  The open communication conception of 
subsystems argues that the power of an actor is dependent on the quality and variety of 
the information it possesses (Thurber 1996).  Information of both high quality and 
variety will allow a subsystem actor more power to influence the policy-making process. 
Bureaucrats and interest groups are incentivized to provide information in an effort to 
influence policy making in the committees.  Moreover, they are incentivized to share 
valuable information because the more useful the information is, the more likely 









Figure 1: Energy Subsystem Example 
In reality, subsystems are much more complex than the example in Figure 1, 
with multiple congressional committees, bureaucracies, businesses, and interest groups 
with actors moving in and out of the system over time.  The subsystem approach, 
however, has persisted in popularity in our field given its ability to facilitate the study of 
bureaucratic politics, public policy, and policy implementation (McCool 1998). 
In fact, most policy making occurs within the subsystem setting—off of the 
agenda and out of the public’s view (Thurber 1991; Jones 1994).  Several well-known 
theories, in particular, the punctuated equilibrium theory and advocacy coalition 
framework, use the subsystem setting to study policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).   According to the punctuated equilibrium 
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theory, when new information enters the subsystem, problem definitions can change 
leading to policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
use the example of nuclear energy to illustrate this point as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  Likewise, the advocacy coalition framework states that as members of a 
coalition (similar to a subsystem) learn from one another, policy change will result 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  A commonly used example of the advocacy 
coalition framework is climate change policy (see Liftin 2000 and Sewell 2005).  As 
policy elites learned more from one another about the causes and consequences of 
climate change, policy changed in a reflection of that new knowledge.   
SUPPLY, PRIORITIZATION, APPLICATION 
The pluralistic theory of information suggests that within a given subsystem, 
each actor competes to supply information to policymakers in an effort to define the 
problem in his or her favor, thereby structuring future debates and potential solutions.  
The oversupply of information resulting from this competitive atmosphere must be 
prioritized by congressional committees.  Only those information suppliers receiving 
attention have the potential to influence the problem definitions and debates.  As you 
can see, there are three basic components in this pluralistic context: supply, 
prioritization, and application. 
The first component of information processing, the supply of information, is 
characterized by providers of information competing to supply information to 
congressional committees on a given topic or policy.  Information prioritization is the 
process of determining which sources of information receive attention and which are 
ignored by the committees.  The third part of information processing is the application 
of information—applying what Congress learned from the prioritized sources to the 
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actual policy process.  For this project, the discussion of the application of information is 
limited to the problem definition stage of the policy process.   
Supply of Information 
Subsystem actors such as, interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and sub-
national governments competing to provide information to Congress in order to 
influence policymaking characterizes the information supply process.  All of these actors 
are motivated to supply information with the intent to influence problem definitions and 
policy making in a specific issue area (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). An advantageous problem definition 
means the problem will not only be discussed in a beneficial light, but the solutions will 
also be structured in a way most likely to benefit the actor (see Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984).  
Localities, for example, often supply information in hopes of promoting their interests.  
In the EISA 2007 example states and localities both were eager to share information 
with Congress in an effort to define the energy problem as a need to be independent of 
fossil fuels.  Independence from fossil fuels would mean less drilling and more subsidies 
for local governments.  Less drilling would benefit states like Alaska and Florida, while 
subsidies favored localities interested in increasing their energy budgets.  However, 
different subsystem actors, sub-national governments, federal bureaucrats, and interest 
groups, vary in their underlying motivations for sharing information.  
State and Local Governments as Information Suppliers 
State and local governments often share information with Congress in an effort 
to garner more programmatic and fiscal assistance (Pelissero and England 1987).  Often 
individual actors from state and local governments, such as state legislators and mayors, 
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testify before Congress to represent their local constituents’ interests.  Sub-national 
government associations, such as the National Governors’ Association, the National 
League of Cities, and the National Conference of State Legislators, provide information 
on behalf of these governments more generally.  Both individual actors and these 
broader associations often provide information to help combat problems lower 
governments face in the federalist system (Pelissero and England 1987).  By providing 
this information, states and localities can influence the policy making process in 
Congress (Pelissero and England 1987). 
Interest Groups as Information Suppliers 
In general, the most important goal of an interest group is to influence the 
government towards their policy preferences.  Providing information to Congress is an 
effective way of achieving that goal (Kingdon 1984; Smith 1995; Burstein and Hirsh 
2007).  Second only to lobbying, testifying at congressional committee hearings is the 
most effective way for interest groups to present Congress with information (Nownes 
2001).   In fact, because hearings have a wider audience, they may be a more efficient 
way for interest groups to disseminate information.4  Further, interest groups see 
testifying at hearings as an indicator of access to Congress (Leyden 1995) and influence 
on policy making (Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Laumann and Knoke 1987).  Interest groups 
that can supply the information that is most desired by Congress are most likely to be 
invited to testify (see Leyden 1995 and Esterling 2004).   
                                                 
4 Leyden (1995) and Wright (1996) point out that hearings are often designed to reflect information 
gained in private.  Several authors note that hearings allow for a broad audience outside of committee 
members to receive information (see Kingdon 1984; Gromley 1998; Burstein and Hirsh 2007). 
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Federal Bureaucrats as Information Suppliers 
Federal bureaucracies are valuable sources of information in the policy-making 
process.  They routinely collect information that aids in not only implementation 
decisions, but also throughout the policy process.  There are three broad reasons why 
bureaucratic agencies share information with Congress: they are forced, they volunteer, 
or because they were designed to do so.  In the first instance, legislative oversight of the 
executive branch can require bureaucracies to share information with Congress whether 
or not bureaucrats are willing.  Often a bureaucracy is eager to share information with 
Congress in an effort to influence public policy, by expanding agenda control (see King 
1997) or by increasing its budget (Dery 1984).  Finally, many bureaucracies have been 
established for the singular purpose of generating information (Carlson 2011; Workman 
2015). 
The Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Economics and Statistics 
Administration (ESA), and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) are 
examples of bureaucracies that were created for the purpose of generating information, 
specifically information regarding policy surveillance (see Feldman and March 1981) 
and the definitions (and importance) of problems (see Katzmann 1989 and Workman 
2015).  The EIA, for instance, is tasked with the collection, publication, and analysis of a 
large variety of measures of the state of energy policy.  The ESA and NCHS provide a 
similar service in the economic and health care policy areas, respectively.   
Prioritization of Information  
The pluralistic perspective of information supply suggests that subsystem actors, 
such as interest groups, federal bureaucrats, states, and municipalities, will compete to 
supply information to Congress to define policy problems and steer policy debates 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and 
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Jochim 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  In this competitive environment, an actor 
chooses not to withhold information for fear of allowing opponents the opportunity to 
define the problem and structure the debate (Simon 1983; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 
2009).  The competition to supply information leads to an oversupply of information 
available to Congress (Simon 1983; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005).  Rather than utilizing a narrow, expert search for information, 
Congress must prioritize abundance of available information.  
Committees, as the information processing mechanisms of Congress (see 
Krehbiel 1992), filter and prioritize the information.  Committees represent not just the 
information processing arm of Congress, but also the information processing hub of the 
subsystems.  Congress relies on committees to communicate with subsystems.  
Congressional committees filter the supplied information and share that information 
with the full chamber.  In addition, committees are able to represent the policy 
preferences of the chamber to the subsystem.  Likewise, subsystems depend on 
committees to communicate with the full chamber.  Committees via hearings are able to 
share both committee and subsystem knowledge and preferences (see Diermeier and 
Feddersen 2000).   
Congressional Hearings  
Hearings offer congressional committees a great way to obtain the information 
necessary for policy making (see Kingdon 1981; Gromley 1998; Burstein and Hirsh 
2007).  Committees call subsystem actors (ex. federal bureaucrats, interest groups, state 
governments) to testify and provide information about a given issue area.  Those actors 
testifying at hearings represent the information priorities of the committee. 
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Committees, witnesses, and the congressional chamber as a whole value 
committee hearings and the role they play in information processing.  The hearing 
testimony helps define problems, structure the solution space, and draft legislation 
(Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2008).  The importance of hearings is further evidenced by 
committees’ willingness to spend money, devote staff resources, and give up personal 
time in order to hold a large number of hearings each year (Diermeier and Feddersen 
2000; Oleszek 1989; see also Jones and Baumgartner 2005).    The fact that individual 
members of Congress frequently testify at committee hearings to share information and 
help shape the policy debate is further evidence of the value of hearings to Congress 
(Diermeier and Fedderson 2000).  Interest groups and other elites testify at hearings as a 
way to influence policy making (Kingdon 1984; Smith 1995; Burstein and Hirsh 2007; 
Laumann and Knoke 1987) and promote their interests (Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  
In fact, Leyden (1995) argues that interest groups testifying is a clear indication of them 
having gained access.  Last, the hearings process is an effective way for committees to 
broadcast private information to the entire chamber (Diermeier and Feddersen 2000).  
Considering C-SPAN and other media coverage, committee hearings make the private 
information held by committee members and witnesses widely known.  
Given the limited resources, especially time, congressional committees must 
decide on which information they deem important and attend to it while ignoring 
everything else.  How congressional committees prioritize information is based on their 
goals of constituency service, making good public policy, or gaining power and prestige.   
Prioritization by Congressional Committees 
Congressional committees are organized substantively by policy topic (ex. House 
Committee on Small Business and House Committee on Energy and Commerce) as well 
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as by function—authorization, appropriations, budgeting, and rules. Committees differ 
not just in their policy-making jurisdictions and roles, but also by their attraction to 
members of Congress.  Previous studies (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997) suggest 
that a member of Congress will request a particular committee given his or her top 
priority—reelection through constituency appeals, power and prestige within the 
chamber, or making good public policy.  The self-selection of members into committees 
for one of these three reasons (constituency service, power, or public policy) leads to 
each committee having one dominant goal. 
Representatives from agriculture-producing districts concerned with constituency 
service will request appointments with the House Agriculture Committee (Fenno 1973; 
Deering and Smith 1997).  As a result, the House Agriculture Committee will have one 
dominant priority—constituency service.  Representatives most interested in achieving 
public policy goals will seek out committees to facilitate their endeavors (Fenno 1973; 
Deering and Smith 1997).  A representative interested in education policy, for instance, 
will seek a position with the House Committee on Education and the Workforce.  The 
third type of committee is the power committee.  Members of Congress most interested 
in power and prestige within their chambers seek appointments to power committees 
(ex. House Committee on Appropriations) (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997).  
Because the majority of a committee’s members chose that particular appointment for 
the same purpose—constituency service, policy, or prestige, each committee has one 
dominant goal.  That goal structures how a given committee prioritizes information.  For 
example, constituency committees are most likely to prioritize information from 
constituents and clientele as well as information that can facilitate their goals of 
constituency service.    
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Even within the same policy area, committees are often interested in different 
dimensions of the problem that are reflective of their goals of service, policy, or power.  
Table 2 offers an example of a hearing held by each committee type on the same public 
law, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (PL 109-140).  Even though the 
committees were working on the same policy, they were interested in different aspects 
of the problem and presumably different types of information. 
Table 2: Examples of Hearings by Committee Type Related to the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 
In this EISA of 2007 example, you can see that a constituency committee (House 
Committee on Small Business) focused on the energy resources available to small 
businesses.  At the same time, a policy committee (House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce) was interested in the automobile industry and its ability to create new, fuel-
efficient vehicles.  A power committee (Senate Committee on Appropriations), was 
interested in different ways to encourage energy conservation and production to limit 
                                                 
5 House Committee on Small Business: Full Committee Hearing on Small Business Energy Priorities on 
October 17, 2007 (ProQuest 2015). 
6 House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality): Hearing on 
Climate and Energy Security: Perspectives from the Automobile Industry on March 14, 2007(ProQuest 
2015). 
7 Senate Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development): Hearing on 
Energy Security and Oil Dependence—Recommendations on Policies and Funding to Reduce U.S. Oil 
Dependence, Special Hearing on May 8, 2007 (ProQuest 2015). 
Committee Type 
Example of a Congressional Committee Hearing on EISA 
2007 
Constituency 
Examines the economic impact of rising energy costs and 
resources that are available to small businesses5 
Policy 
Examines the efforts of the automobile industry to develop 
fuel-saving technologies and vehicles6 
Power 
To examine efforts to reduce dependence on foreign oil and 
promote energy independence and security through increased 
efficiency and conservation7 
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U.S. dependence on foreign oil.  Generally, it seems that while these three committees 
were concerned with rising energy costs and conservation efforts, they were each 
attending to a different attribute of the problem.  It follows that their information 
priorities are driven by their goals in two ways.  First, a committee’s goals lead them to 
have coalitional preferences for information providers (Fenno 1973).  For example, 
constituency committees prefer information from their constituents and clientele; 
whereas, power committees prefer information from other power actors, such as fellow 
members of Congress and high-ranking federal bureaucrats.  Second, from a practical 
standpoint, committees need information that is relevant and can help them achieve their 
goals of service, policy, or power.  For example, the House Committee on Small 
Business may favor small business owners given their unique knowledge of relevant 
problems and policies.   
Application of Information  
The final component of information processing, application of information, 
occurs when congressional committees take the information gained from prioritization 
and apply it in the problem definition stage of the policy process.  When problem 
definitions change, we are likely to see policy change in response (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). There are a number of examples of new 
problem definitions leading to policy change, including the nuclear energy example 
discussed above, climate change (see  Liftin 2000 and Sewell 2005), and the death 
penalty (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008).  A more recent example is that of 
same-sex marriage.  As the problem has been re-defined in terms of equal rights rather 
than in terms of morality, we have seen major policy changes in a relatively short period 
of time.   
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Actors, such as bureaucrats and interest groups, want to share information to 
further their interests.  These actors supply information in a competitive context, 
resulting in an oversupply of subsystem-generated information that must be prioritized 
by congressional committees (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and 
Jochim 2009).  Information is prioritized depending on a number of factors including the 
three highlighted in this study: the goals of the congressional committee, the policy area, 
as well as the presence of problem uncertainty (all of which will be discussed in detail 
the next chapter).   
By supplying information to congressional committees, bureaucrats, and other 
subsystem actors have the potential to influence congressional actions, including 
defining problems and advocating for certain policies (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Smith 1995; Burstein and Hirsh 2007).  The more attention a subsystem 
actor gains, the more likely it will be able to influence committee actions as evidenced 
by another example from Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).  One 
of the biggest components of EISA 2007 was an increase in the Corporate Average Fuel 
Efficiency (CAFE) standards, the first statutory increase since 1975 (“Details…” 2007).  
The new CAFE standards required automakers “to meet a minimum fleet wide fuel 
efficiency standard of 35 miles per gallon” by the year 2020 (“Details…” 2007).8  The 
increase in CAFE standards was particularly troublesome for American auto 
manufacturing companies than for some foreign automakers, such as Toyota, already 
exceeded then-current CAFE standards (Automotive News 2007).   
These foreign automakers and the Association of International Automobile 
Manufacturers (AIAM) were actively working with Congress to increase CAFE 
                                                 
8 The new CAFE standards are roughly a 40 percent increase over the then current standards (“Details…” 
2007) 
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standards9 (Automotive News 2007). In addition, several corporations and the Energy 
Security Leadership Council, which included airline companies and investments firms 
among others, pushed Congress to increase CAFE standards (Ackley 2007).   
On the other side of the debate, the American automobile industry sought to 
redefine the problem by reweighting its dimensions, specifically by placing greater 
emphasis on issues of the free market rather than on oil independence. The American 
automobile industry and their supporters10 highlighted the importance of the free market 
economics. The automakers provided information that illustrated the usefulness of 
diverse fleets in lowering auto emissions (Ackley 2007; Dingell 2006).  Auto Alliance 
(an automobile manufacturers’ trade association), in particular, argued that energy 
independence and security would best be achieved, especially in free market terms, by 
offering a range of diverse vehicles, powered by a variety of fuels and allowing supply 
and demand to take over (Ackley 2007).  Unfortunately for the American automobile 
industry, they were not able to reweight the issue in their favor.  The information 
supplied by the diverse coalition of foreign automakers, AIAM, the airline industry, and 
investment firms was able to move Congress to increase CAFE standards for the first 
time in three decades.   
As evidenced in this example, subsystem actors are eager to provide 
congressional committees with information in an effort to influence the policy-making 
process.  The result of groups and bureaucrats competing to supply information is an 
oversupply of information.  This oversupply of information is congruent with the 
                                                 
9 While these automakers supported increases to CAFÉ standards, some were opposed to Congress being 
the one to set the new levels.  In particular, Toyota supported increases to CAFE standards, but wanted 
those increases to be determined by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rather than by 
congressional statute (Ackley 2007). 
10 Most notably, United States Representative John Dingell, Jr. (D-MI) (Dingell 2006; Dennis 2007; 
“Details…” 2007). 
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pluralistic perspective of information processing (Simon 1983; Kingdon 1984; Laumann 
and Knoke 1987; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Esterling 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  Much of the policy-making power of both 
bureaucrats and interest groups is a result of information sharing in the subsystem 
setting.   
Subsystem actors are aware that valuable, quality information is more likely to 
be rewarded with congressional attention and compete with one another to provide it 
(Simon 1983; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Esterling 2004; Workman, Jones, and 
Jochim 2009).  The limited nature of the hearings process exacerbates the competition to 
supply information.  Members of Congress have limits on both their time and resources, 
the more time and resources they devote to hearings the less they have available for 
floor debates and action (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Further, within a given hearing, 
these same resources are limited, meaning attention granted to one interest group or 
bureaucratic agency means attention is less likely to be granted to another (Simon 1983; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Those sources of information that are prioritized by 
Congress via become much more likely to influence problem definitions and policy 
outcomes.   
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Chapter 3: A New Approach to Information Prioritization 
Information processing varies depending on the issue context, dimensionality of 
the problem, availability of information, and the goals of suppliers.  The pluralistic 
theory of information explains information processing in problem-space politics or 
situations with high problem dimensionality and high levels of available information 
supplied in a competitive supply environment.  Solution-space politics, situations with 
well-defined problems and limited, costly information supplied in an incentive-based 
environment, are best characterized by the economic theory of information.  The two 
theories suggest that there are different strategies for collecting information.  In the first 
case, Congress is most likely focused on prioritizing an oversupply of information.  In 
the second context, Congress uses a narrow, expert search strategy to solicit the 
necessary information.   
Congressional committee’s strategies for gathering information, especially 
information prioritization, are at the heart of this project.  The pluralistic information 
theory of information processing informs the research questions herein.  The oversupply 
of information available to congressional committees requires that they prioritize 
information suppliers, choosing to grant access to some sources of information while 
denying others.  Gaining access, supplying information via congressional hearings (see 
Leyden 1995), allows subsystem actors to help define problems, structure debates, and 
influence the policy process.  A better understanding of the prioritization process of 
congressional committees will provide insight into committees’ information preferences 
and the ability of subsystem actors to supply information and influence the policy 
process.  How do the information preferences of committees differ by policy area, 
committee goals, and uncertainty?  Do federal bureaucrats have an advantage in the 
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information supply process?  How do congressional committees make tradeoffs between 
information suppliers when engaged in information prioritization?  When do non-
bureaucrats appear to have an information advantage? 
This chapter is organized to present the questions posed above and the research 
design behind their exploration.  In the first of the two sections that follow, three 
important factors for determining committees’ information preferences are identified: 
policy area, committee goals, and problem uncertainty.  The latter half of this chapter 
outlines the research design and data used to address each of these questions on 
committees’ prioritization processes, advantaged suppliers, and information tradeoffs. 
INFORMATION PRIORITIZATION 
Congressional policy making requires information.  The oversupply of 
subsystem-generated information in problem-space politics means that Congress’s task 
is not soliciting for information but rather prioritizing the abundance of available 
information.  That is, Congress must decide what to attend and what to ignore.  In this 
dissertation, I argue that committee hearings act as the prioritization mechanism for 
filtering information because not only do members of Congress see hearings as an 
efficient way to gather information (see Kingdon 1981; Gormley 1998; Burstein and 
Hirsh 2007), but also hearings are a vehicle through which Congress and policy 
subsystems communicate.  By inviting certain subsystem players to testify at hearings 
and not others, committees select what information to attend and what information to 
ignore.   
Figure 2 shows the three components of information processing in problem-
space politics and the key determinants of each.  The supply of information is 
characterized by competition among actors (ex. bureaucrats and interest groups) to 
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supply information to Congress (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Simon 1983; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005).  The prioritization of information, the focus of this project, is 
determined, in part, by the policy area, the committee’s goals, and the presence of 
problem uncertainty.  How a committee prioritizes information is important given the 
third component of information processing, the application of information.  Information 
prioritized and attended to by the committee can be applied to the policy process, 
specifically at the problem definition stage, and can greatly influence policy outcomes.  
In short, prioritized information helps committee define problems, and those problem 
definitions will structure which policy solutions will be available at later stages of the 




Figure 2: Three Stages of Information Processing in Congressional Committees 
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Most studies of information in the policy process concentrate on the sources of 
information (see Miller 2004), but the prioritization or receptivity matters as well.  
Congressional committees prioritize subsystem-generated information based on three 
key factors, policy area, committee goals, and the presence of problem uncertainty. 
Information Prioritization by Policy Area 
Few would argue that the factors (ex. subsystem actors, policy preferences) that 
drive policy changes are the same in all issue areas.  Grossman (2013) finds that policy 
areas differ in a number of ways, including the venues in which policies are enacted and 
the composition of relevant actors.  For issue areas like energy, for example, policy 
change is disproportionately administrative-driven (Grossman 2013).  Federal 
bureaucrats should be highly influential in an area like energy.  Health care, in contrast, 
is much more likely to be changed as a result of legislative enactments in Congress 
(Grossman 2013).  Policy change in domestic finance and commerce is likely to 
originate in both Congress and the courts (Grossman 2013).  Policy areas in which 
change is most likely to occur in Congress or in multiple venues allow for a more 
diverse group of actors, including, a broader group of legislators, interest groups, and 
federal judges. 
The types of actors included in policy making in a given area also depends on the 
dominant weights used in the issue area.  Some issues are considered low dimensional 
not because they are necessarily well-defined in terms of their attributes, but because 
their problem attributes are weighted largely by ideology or party preferences (see Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997; Jochim and Jones 2013).11  Partisan coalitions (both liberal and 
                                                 
11 Jochim and Jones (2013) use roll call votes coded according the Policy Agendas Project’s policy areas 
to calculate the dimensionality of policy areas using roll call data and Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) 
NOMINATE scores.  The Policy Agendas Project’s coding scheme is also utilized in this study so the 
findings for dimensionality can be directly applied to this project. (My use of the Policy Agenda’s 
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conservative) are likely to be highly prevalent in supplying information in policy areas 
that are evaluated in terms of ideological or partisan weights.12  In a similar vein, some 
issues, like energy, are characterized by high dimensionality.13  For these issue areas, 
problem dimensions are weighted by party preferences as well as those specific to 
particular regions14 or clientele groups.  Representative John Dingell’s (D-MI) 
reluctance in 2007 to increase fuel efficiency standards on automakers in his home state 
is an example of clientele preferences at odds with party and ideological preferences 
(Dingell 2006; Dennis 2007; “Details…” 2007).  Similarly, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) 
and the Democratic delegation from Nevada has opposed their party’s efforts to 
establish Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste disposal site because of regional 
preferences (“Plan…” 1995; “Nevada…” 1998).  Because  the weights of problem 
attributes are more difficult to establish in these high-dimension issue areas, Congress 
must prioritize information from a wider range of actors, including clientele, states and 
localities, and individual constituents, to winnow problem dimensionality. 
Another way to differentiate between policy areas is by their publics or active 
members of their subsystems (see May 1991).  May (1991) looks at differences between 
policies with publics or large, diverse subsystems and those without publics or small, 
limited subsystems.  A policy with a public has a large number of actors within it 
subsystem that compete to supply information (May 1991).  In these policy areas, a 
more diverse group of information suppliers will be successful in providing information 
                                                                                                                                                
Project’s coding scheme (and the coding scheme itself) will be discussed in further detail later in this 
chapter.) 
12 Labor and employment, housing, and macroeconomic policies are other areas that are characterized by 
low dimensionality (see Jochim and Jones 2013). 
13 Agriculture, Trade, and Science policies are also examples of issues that are characterized by high 
dimensionality (see Jochim and Jones 2013).  
14 See May, Sapotichne, and Workman (2006) and their work on policy coherence in regional policy 
domains.   
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to Congress.  These policy domains often regard private risks that affect specific groups, 
which mobilize and supply information to Congress to define problems and steer 
debates.  In U.S. banking regulatory policy, for instance, banks, trade associations, and 
federal bureaucrats among others are capable of sharing pertinent information to 
Congress.  This diverse range of information suppliers allows congressional committees 
the opportunity to prioritize information from a variety of sources if they so choose.  
Policies without publics, though, have a much smaller number of groups 
supplying information because these policies tend to focus on public risks, such as 
natural and technical hazards (May 1991).  Information suppliers in these areas, then, 
tend to be limited largely to scientific and technical experts.  In policy areas without 
publics, a small number of actors has a monopoly on indispensable information, 
meaning a less diverse set of subsystem actors will be successful in supplying 
information.  For example, policies regarding nuclear energy, perceived largely as a 
public risk, require a very specialized set of technical information, with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission being one of very few subsystem actors capable of supplying it.  
The nature of the policy area influences how Congress attends to different 
sources of information.  Issue areas differ by policy-making venue, some policies are 
administratively driven (ex. energy) while others are legislatively-driven (ex. health 
care).  Issues can also be separated by the dominate weights used in the issue area and 
by the substantive information necessary and available for policy making.   The nature 
of the policy area influences whether Congress must rely on a more narrow set of 
experts or on a broad set of suppliers for information.   
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Information Prioritization by Committee 
Within each policy subsystem, congressional committees must prioritize 
information.  In addition to the policy specific considerations mentioned above, 
committee goals help shape informaiton prioritization.  Chapter Two argued that 
committees attract goal-oriented members.  Those members of Congress most interested 
in constituency service will be attracted to a committee that can facilitate that service.  
The same is true for members interested in making good public policy or obtaining 
power.  Each committee is then populated by members who share similar goals if not 
similar ideological, policy, or outcome preferences.  The result is that each ocmmittee 
has one dominant goal or priority of constituency service, making policy, or gaining 
power.  The dominant prioirity of the committee affects how it prioirtizes subsystem-
generated information, in particular, it helps determine which types of information 
sources testify at hearings.   
Representatives from agriculture-producing districts concerned with constituency 
service request appointments with the House Agriculture Committee (Fenno 1973; 
Deering and Smith 1997).  As a result, the House Agriculture Committee has one 
dominant priority—constituency service.  The fact that the House Agriculture 
Committee members all share the same goal of constituency service is reflected in the 
way the committee prioritizes information by giving preference to clientele and 
constituents at hearings.  Representatives most interested in achieving public policy 
goals seek out committees to facilitate their endeavors (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 
1997).  A representative interested in education policy seeks a position with the House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce.  This type of committee tends to prioritize 
partisan and group sources of information (interest groups and fellow members of 
Congress) due to individual members seeking to support their ideological positions on 
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policy.  The third type of committee is the power committee.  Members of Congress 
most interested in power and prestige within their chambers seek appointments to power 
committees (ex. House Committee on Appropriations) (Fenno 1997; Deering and Smith 
1997).  Because members of power committees want to illustrate their power in 
comparison to their colleagues, they likely issue a disproportionate amount of invitations 
to testify to fellow members of Congress.  In addition, these power committees, which 
typically deal with appropriations and budgets for the federal government, tend to rely 
heavily on information from federal bureaucrats.  Federal bureaucrats are able to supply 
the most information on the goings-on of the federal government.  See Table 3 for an 
example of congressional committees15 that held hearings during this time by type 
(constituency, policy, and power) and the information priorities we should expect for 
each. 
Table 3: Congressional Committee Types, Examples and Information Priorities 
 
 
 The overarching goal of the committee leads to a general preference for the type 
of information supplier.  Constituency committees, for example, favor clientele and 
                                                 
15 See Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2 for a full list of all congressional committees testifying in these 
three policy areas and how they were categorized.  
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constituency groups, including businesses and state and local governments.  Agreement 
on a goal, such as constituency service, does not mean that the committee members 
favor the same information suppliers.  In fact, members are most likely going to prefer 
their own constituents and businesses that are influential in their individual districts.  
Even with disagreement over the specific suppliers, information providers that can 
support the committees’ goals are prioritized over other source types.  In policy 
committees, members’ specific preferences will be divided among liberal and 
conservative interest groups in an effort to support individual policy inclinations, but 
interest groups as a whole are prioritized more frequently given their value to achieving 
committee goals.  
Information Prioritization and Problem Uncertainty 
As mentioned previously, information is necessary for policy making.  
Information becomes even more important when Congress is faced with problem 
uncertainty.  Problem uncertainty describes when Congress (or a committee) is unsure 
about the nature of the problem or which problem is the most pressing.  Figure 3 shows 
problem uncertainty across congressional committees as illustrated by the hearings each 
held.  Committee A focuses solely on Problem₁ (only holding hearings on one problem), 
which illustrates a very low level of problem uncertainty.  That is, Committee A has 
identified the problem and is working to address it.  Committee B is splitting attention 
between multiple potential problems in a given month, depicting a much higher level of 
problem uncertainty.  Committee B is not focused on a specific problem because it is 
less sure about both the nature and importance of the problems.  Low uncertainty means 
the problem has been identified.  High problem uncertainty means the problem is still 
largely unknown.   
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Figure 3: Problem Uncertainty in Congressional Committees 
Congress struggling to define (or determine the importance of) a problem is 
evidence of problem uncertainty in practice.  May, Sapotichne, and Workman (2009) 
find an increase in congressional hearings and the mobilization of subsystem actors for 
the purpose of gathering information to deal with the uncertainty present in homeland 
security policy after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  In fact, Lewallen and 
colleagues (2015) find that about one-quarter of legislative hearings investigate problem 
definition or importance. 
Workman and Shafran (2009) argue that the three most important characteristics 
of information for alleviating problem uncertainty are accuracy, reliability, and stability.  
Information must be accurate and factual, at least close enough to the truth that Congress 
can correctly weigh the importance of the information.  Information must also be 
reliable or consistent.  Information provided at Time2 must be consistent with 
information provided at Time1.  Information suppliers must not only be accurate, but 
predictable.  Third, policy makers prefer stable information suppliers who have been and 
will continue to participate in the subsystem’s politics.  Information suppliers must have 
a long-term stake in policy outcomes.   






Committee A Committee B
Hearings in Time₁
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Of all potential sources of information for Congress to choose from, federal 
bureaucrats have a clear information-supply advantage, given these three preferred 
characteristics of information.  In terms of accuracy, many bureaucracies have been 
created for the sole purpose of generating information (Carlson 2011; Workman 2015).  
Further, even if bureaucrats bias information in their interests (King 1997; Dery 1984), 
Congress can more easily account for their biases than those of other information 
suppliers.  Congress and bureaucracies repeatedly interact throughout the policy process 
(see Aberbach 1990; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 
2009; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  These repeated interactions alert Congress to 
any existing biases and allow them to accurately weight the biases in decision making.  
Further, bureaucracies are created with missions defined by federal statute and often face 
little to no competition (relative to the private sector).  This lack of competition 
increases the reliability of information because bureaucrats have a set mission and little 
incentive to deviate from that mission or to provide inconsistent information.  In terms 
of stability, bureaucracies have very long life-spans, especially in comparison to their 
private counterparts.   
Information is necessary to combat the problem uncertainty that exists when 
Congress is unable to define either a problem or a problem’s relative importance.  
Accurate, reliable, and stable information is most helpful in times of uncertainty.  As 
such, federal bureaucrats have an inherent information advantage over other subsystem 
actors.  When problem uncertainty is high, Congress relies more heavily on federal 
bureaucrats to supply information.  
Differences in policy area, committee goals and the level of problem uncertainty 
help determine which sources of information Congress prioritizes.  Only those sources 
of information that receive attention from Congress have the opportunity to influence the 
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problem definition and policy process.  A committee is most likely to prioritize those 
sources with unique information, those that can promote the committee’s overarching 
goal, and those that reduce problem uncertainty. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Subsystem-generated information has the potential to drastically influence the 
policy-making process.  Every year Congress holds 1500-2000 hearings to get the 
information necessary for policy making.16 Congressional committees invite businesses, 
interest groups, state and local governments, and federal bureaucrats to testify and 
supply the information. By providing information, these actors: businesses, interest 
groups, bureaucrats, help define problems, set the agenda, and shape public policy.  This 
dissertation looks at the way in which information is gathered across policy areas, by 
congressional committees, and in response to problem uncertainty as well as how 
congressional committees adjust their search strategies over time.     
Because of the potential for subsystem-generated information to define 
problems, shape debates, and, ultimately, impact legislation, it is very important to 
understand how congressional committees choose to gather information. To investigate 
this new approach of information prioritization in subsystem politics, this project utilizes 
congressional hearings.  Congressional committee hearings offer an opportunity to 
observe information providers (i.e. bureaucrats and interest groups) and information 
receivers (congressional committees) interacting in a formal, well-documented setting.  
The bureaucrats and interest groups want to supply information in order to help define 
problems and influence the policy-making process (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009; Simon 1983).  The receivers—congressional 
                                                 
16 See the Policy Agendas Project www.policyagendas.org. 
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committees—must prioritize all of the possible information providers, deciding whom to 
attend and whom to ignore.  Members of Congress have limited time, resources, and 
staff and, therefore, are unable to attend to all possible sources of information (see Hall 
1987; Oleszek 1989; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  As a result, committees must 
decide how to allocate their limited attention to a select number of information 
providers.  How committees determine which providers to attend and which to ignore is 
dependent on three key things: the goal of the committee, policy area, and the amount of 
uncertainty the committee has about the policy problem.   
While committees can get information in a number of ways outside of the 
hearings process (via lobbying, for example), hearings are a formal statement of the 
information preferences of the committee.  The information preferences exhibited in the 
committee hearings reflect those exhibited elsewhere by allowing members to publicize 
the information they have obtained in private (Wright 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 
2000).  Further, given that members of Congress routinely testify themselves, they 
believe that hearings display information to a wide audience (Kingdon 1984; Gromley 
1998; Burstein and Hirsh 2007).   
Those information providers testifying at congressional committee hearings 
represent the information that committees have prioritized.  In fact, testifying at hearings 
has been previously used as a measure of access for interest groups (Leyden 1995).  In 
other words, testifying at hearings is a highly visible point at which an interest group, 
sub-national government, or bureaucracy can successfully present information to 
Congress.  
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Research Questions and Expectations 
Understanding information processing in policy making is essential for two 
reasons.  First, members of Congress need both policy and political information about a 
topic for policy making to occur.  In the words of Baumgartner and Jones (2015, p. 61), 
“Information is politics.”  Second, new information in the system can redefine or 
reprioritize the attributes of a problem and lead to major policy changes (see 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Subsystem actors—interest groups, bureaucrats, and even states and localities—
produce information to supply to Congress in hopes of influencing policy to favor their 
preferences.  The existing theories of policy change—punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993) show that subsystem-generated information has the potential to define 
problems, structure policy debate, and shape public policy.  Information processing is 
the process by which information is made available information, prioritized by 
Congress, and potentially applied to the policy making.  How congressional committees 
filter information—give access to one set of information providers while denying others 
is at the core of this project.  What factors influence the way in which congressional 
committees filter available information?  How do committees make tradeoffs amongst 
information suppliers? How do information tradeoffs vary by subsystem? 
This project is interested primarily in two sets of research questions.  The first 
focuses on the role of bureaucrats as information suppliers.  How do committees 
prioritize the bureaucrats and do their priorities shift given policy area, goals and 
problem uncertainty?  The second set of questions look at tradeoffs between other 
witness types.  How do committees make tradeoffs between witness types?  Are certain 
witness types more or less likely to testify depending on the subsystem?  
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Prioritizing Federal Bureaucrats 
Federal bureaucrats have an advantage in the information sharing process as 
argued in Chapter Two.  The motives for bureaucrats to supply information differ from 
other actor types.  In fact, often bureaucrats are created for the sole purpose of supplying 
information to policy makers, such as the Government Accountability Office and the 
Energy Information Administration.  Bureaucrats also share a unique, long-standing 
relationship with members of Congress with many repeated interactions.  Chapter Four 
investigates how bureaucrats are prioritized as informaiton suppliers given their inherent 
advantages in supplying information to Congress.  
Bureaucrats vary in popularity as information suppliers by policy area.  In energy 
policy, for example, bureaucracies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are 
likely to have information that is not readily available from other sources.  The same is 
true for certain agencies in health care policy (e.g. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention).  Bureaucratic agencies are less likely to hold private information in a policy 
area like domestic commerce and banking regulation given the ability of the private 
sector to produce competing information.  
Power committees favor bureaucratic information more than other committee 
types for two reasons.  First, power committees favor political elite, like presidentially 
appointed bureaucrats, as sources of information given their goals of achieving greater 
political power.  Second, power committees have a shared task of overseeing the federal 
bureaucracy.  No one knows more about the federal bureaucracy than federal 
bureaucrats.  Therefore, power committees invite more bureaucrats to testify than either 
constituency or policy committees.  The following expectations should hold true for 
federal bureaucrats as information suppliers:  
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1: The number of federal bureaucrats invited to testify at congressional 
committee hearings varies by both policy area reflecting the likelihood of 
bureaucrats having information monopolies.   
 
1a: Bureaucrats are less likely to testify at hearings on domestic 
commerce than at hearings on energy or health care. 
 
2: Power committees invite more bureaucrats to testify relative to the 
other committee types because bureaucrats hold information most likely 
to help committees achieve their goals and complete their oversight tasks. 
Bureaucrats have the greatest information advantage when congressional 
committees face uncertainty about either the nature or the importance of a problem.  
When confronted with problem uncertainty, congressional committees rely more heavily 
on those actors with whom they have the longest standing relationships and can most 
easily account for any possible bias—federal bureaucrats.  
The bureaucrats’ information supply advantages are magnified for careerist 
bureaucrats.  Careerist, as opposed to presidential appointed, bureaucrats often work for 
the federal government for decades and are likely to have repeated interactions with 
congressional committees during their careers.  Their expertise and extensive experience 
means that in the presence of problem uncertainty committees will rely heavily on 
careerist bureaucrats in particular.  The following expectations should hold true for 
bureaucrats given their unique ability to help committees cope with uncertainty. 
 
3:  All committees with problem uncertainty prioritize bureaucrats as 
sources of information. 
3a: Careerist bureaucrats are more preferred than their presidentially 
appointed counterparts during times of uncertainty because of greater 
levels of expertise and longer relationships with congressional 
committees.   
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These first sets of expectations regarding the prominence of federal bureaucrats 
testifying at congressional committee hearings will be further discussed and explored in 
Chapter Four.  Findings suggest that bureaucrats do have an information advantage over 
other information providers, particularly when congressional committees are responding 
to problem uncertainty. 
Information Tradeoffs in Energy Policy 
The second look at information prioritization addresses the tradeoffs 
congressional committees make across information suppliers in energy policy.  Energy 
policy is the most multidimensional issue area included in this study (see Jochim and 
Jones 2013).  The multidimensionality of this policy area means that there is the 
potential for a wider range of problem definitions and types of actors.  As discussed 
earlier, preferences in energy policy are driven not only by ideological and partisan 
concerns, but also by concerns for constituents, clientele, and region.   
Within energy policy, subsystem actors generate information to supply to 
congressional committees. Each committee must filter through the barrage of 
subsystem-generated information. The goals (constituency service, power and prestige, 
or public policy) of each committee determine which sources of information are most 
likely to receive attention. 
Constituency committees prioritize information generated by businesses, interest 
groups, state and local governments, and individual constituents. These four groups are 
most likely to represent the committees’ clientele and constituents. Policy committees 
pay most attention to interest groups and members of Congress because these witness 
types are most likely to provide the information to reinforce previously held policy 
positions. Power committees prioritize information generated by bureaucrats and 
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members of Congress because these witnesses provide the most information on the inner 
workings of the federal government as well as reinforce the prestige and power of these 
committees. 
 
4: The dominant goal of the committee determines how it filters 
subsystem-generated information—which sources of information receive 
attention and which do not. 
Committees can only choose to prioritize available information.  Some policies, 
those with publics, have a greater number of actors capable of supplying information 
than those policies without publics.  For policies with publics, the individual motivations 
to supply information are high given the risks are private.  For policies without publics, 
individual actors are less motivated to supply information, either due to an inability or 
because the problem is perceived to be a public risk and does not pose a direct theory to 
any specific actor. 
5: The subsystem actors that are capable of supplying information vary 
by specific policy area. 
5a: Policies with publics have more diverse set of actors competing to 
supply information so committees are able to prioritize a wider range of 
actors. 
5b: Policies without publics have limited set of actors supplying 
information so committees are limited to the groups they can prioritize, 
usually bureaucrats or other technical experts.   
How congressional committees make information tradeoffs in energy policy will 
be explored in Chapters Five and Six.  Findings suggest that committees have distinct 
information preferences that vary by their goals, especially in terms of bureaucrats and 
businesses.  Their information preferences also appear to vary by the specific energy 
issue being addressed. 
 54 
Data: Collection and Coding 
To study how congressional committees prioritize information in the subsystem 
setting, this project looks at which information providers testify at committee hearings.  
Those testifying represent the information prioritized by the presiding committee.  Who 
testifies (provides information) is dependent on the policy area, the committee’s goal, 
and the committee’s uncertainty about the problem. 
The Policy Agendas Project’s17 Congressional Hearings Dataset was used as an 
index18 to identify all hearings on domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy 
areas.  The Policy Agendas Project uses a content coding scheme, which is consistent 
both over time and across institutions.  In this dataset, each hearing is coded based on its 
description for a major topic area (ex. Energy) and a specific minor topic area (ex. Coal).  
See Table 4 for a clear description of the domestic commerce, energy, and health care 
topic areas and the minor topic areas for each according to the Policy Agendas 
codebook.19  As you can see, each policy area covers a wide range of topics.  Domestic 
commerce, for instance, covers a number of policy topics, including banking regulation, 
consumer protections, and bankruptcy.  The multifaceted nature of each of these three 
policy areas is an important factor to keep in mind.  Energy policy, for instance, covers a 
                                                 
17 The Policy Agendas Project uses a consistent policy content coding scheme.  This coding system allows 
policy processes to be compared to one another as well as across time.  The Policy Agendas Project’s 
major and minor topic codes identify the main or general topic area (e.g., 1 = Macroeconomics) and then 
the minor or specific subtopic area (e.g., 108 = Industrial Policy).  The Policy Agendas Project data used 
here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National 
Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Department of 
Government at the University of Texas at Austin and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State 
University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis 
reported here 
18 A list of all hearings in domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy using the Policy Agendas 
Project’s Congressional Hearings Dataset was created, which included a CIS identification number for 
each hearing.  Using the CIS number, information on the witnesses testifying was collected.  See the 
discussion on the collection of witness data for more information.   
19 See Appendix B, Table B1 for full listing of the Policy Agendas Project’s policy areas used in this 
project. 
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multitude of issue areas, including nuclear energy, gas and oil policy, as well as 
alternative and renewable fuels.  Because there are so many ways to debate energy 
problems, how problems are defined is particularly important.  Energy defined by a 
priority on American oil independence will require a much different solution than 
energy policy defined in terms of energy conservation and climate change.   
Table 4: Issues Covered by Policy Area 
 
 These three policy areas offer both a wide variety of actors and congressional 
committees.  The committees with jurisdiction in health care and domestic commerce 
differ from those involved in energy.  The same can be said of those actors—interest 
groups, businesses, and bureaucrats—invited to testify in the three different policy areas.  
In addition, these three policy areas differ in terms of political context (Jochim and 
Jones 2013).  Energy is a multidimensional policy area determined by partisan as well as 
distributive politics (Jochim and Jones 2013).  Conversely, health care is a 
unidimensional policy area in which policy change can be largely explained in terms of 
partisanship (Jochim and Jones 2013).  Domestic commerce policy in recent years has 
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been trending from a multidimensional policy area to one more accurately characterized 
as unidimensional (Jochim and Jones 2013).  The selection of energy, health, and 
business regulation policy areas allows for the comparison of the information 
prioritization processes in a variety of political contexts and subsystems.   
Using the Policy Agendas Project’s Congressional Hearings Dataset as an index, 
4,745 hearings were identified across the domestic commerce, energy and health policy 
areas.20  In Table 5 you can see the number of hearings held on each topic area included 
in this study.  Congress held over two thousand hearings on domestic commerce, 
accounting for roughly 45 percent of the hearings in this dataset.  Committee hearings 
on energy make up a much smaller percentage of the dataset, with only 826 hearings 
during this time frame.   Major events during this time frame that demanded 
considerable congressional attention include the September 11th terrorist attacks, the 
wars in the Middle East, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two major energy bills in 2005 
and 2007, respectively, the financial crisis of 2008, and the first two years of the health 
care reform debates.   
Table 5: Number of Congressional Committee Hearings by Policy Area, 1995-2010 
 
                                                 
20 The number does not include hearings held by Joint Committees or temporary committees.  Also 
excluded were hearings with no witnesses and two extreme outliers. 
 57 
To measure which information providers are prioritized, all witnesses (33,090) 
were collected from ProQuest.21  See Table 6 for a summary of the number of witnesses 
testifying in each topic area during the 1995-2010 time frame as well as the average 
number of witnesses per hearing for each topic area.  As you can see, the average 
number of witnesses is very consistent across domestic commerce, energy, and health 
policy areas included in this study with roughly seven witnesses testifying at a given 
congressional hearing.  The range of witnesses testifying at hearings in this dataset 
ranges from 1 to 71.22 
Table 6: Number of Witnesses Testifying at Congressional Committee Hearings by 
Policy Area, 1995-2010 
 
 Finally, each witness was then coded according to his or her affiliation, whom he 
or she was representing.  There are five major categories of witnesses: public 
institutions, government, businesses, interest groups, and “other”.  Each of these major 
categories has multiple subcategories.  The government category, for example, has three 
subcategories: federal bureaucrats, members of Congress, and states and localities.  
                                                 
21 “ProQuest Congressional Publications.” ProQuest LLC, 2015.  The CIS numbers provided by the 
Policy Agendas Project’s Congressional Hearings dataset were used to locate the full hearing information 
for each entry using ProQuest.  Once each hearing was located using ProQuest, all witnesses testifying at 
the hearings, their affiliations, as well as several additional hearing-specific variables were collected.  
22 If the two extreme outliers are included and those hearings with no witnesses, the actual range is 0 to 
168.  Two hearings on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1996 CIS 95-H181-48 and 
95-H181-49 had 133 and 168 witnesses testifying, respectively.  These two hearings were dropped form 
the analysis given that they were both such extreme outliers.   
 58 
Additionally, each federal bureaucrat was coded for whether he or she was a careerist or 
a presidential appointee.  See Table 7 for a brief summary of witness types. 23   
Table 7: Coding Scheme for Witnesses Testifying at Congressional Committee Hearings 
 
 In addition to the witnesses testifying at congressional committees, the 
dependent variable of this study, there are two important independent variables that 
warrant attention: committee goals and problem uncertainty.  Besides the influence of 
                                                 
23 This coding scheme is loosely based off of the work by Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury (1997), 
which categorized different organization types active in agriculture, energy, health, and labor policy 
domains (p. 63).  See Appendix C, Table C1 for a detailed discussion of the coding scheme.   
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policy area on committees’ information preferences, a committees overarching goal and 
the presence of problem uncertainty should impact which sources of information are 
invited to testify and which are ignored.  The discussion below details how committee 
goals were determined and problem uncertainty measured.   
As discussed earlier, members of Congress select committees based on an 
individual priority—constituency service, making good public policy, or gaining power 
or prestige in the chamber (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997).  As a result of this 
self-selection, each committee has one shared goal.  Based loosely on Fenno (1973) and 
Deering and Smith (1997), committees were categorized into three types—constituency, 
policy, or power and prestige—based on their goals.  Constituency committees are those 
whose shared goal is reelection via constituency service.  Members of policy committees 
have a common goal of making good public policy though individual policy objectives 
may vary greatly.  Power committee members have a mutual goal of gaining power and 
prestige within their chamber.  The shared goal of a given committee influences how it 
prioritizes information.  For instance, constituency committees, like the House Small 
Business Committee, favor information from constituents or clientele, such as the 
National Small Business Association.  Policy Committees favor members of their 
partisan coalitions (ex. interest groups and partisan elites); whereas power committees 
favor political elites (ex. bureaucrats and members of Congress).  
In addition to these three committee types originally introduced by Fenno (1973), 
Deering and Smith (1997) introduce a fourth, “mixed committees.”  To account for 
Deering and Smith’s (1997) “mixed committees”, such as the Senate Committee on 
Small Business, I use the committees’ websites and recent activities to determine its 
category according to Fenno’s (1973) tripartite coding scheme.  The Senate Committee 
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on Small Business’s web page24 shows a clear devotion to constituency service; 
whereas, public policy seems like a secondary consideration.  Therefore, the committee 
is categorized as a constituency committee.  I also deviate from Deering and Smith 
(1997) by having power committees in the Senate.   
Table 8: Examples of Congressional Committees by Type 
 
 See Table 8 for a subset of congressional committees25  that held hearings during 
this time by type: constituency, policy, or power.  Committees, such as House 
Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, are coded as 
constituency committees.  Members of Congress request these committees to serve their 
constituents and clientele (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997).  Examples of policy 
committees include the House Education and the Workforce Committee and the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.  Members of Congress requested 
these committees to influence policy (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997).  The 
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Appropriations are 
power committees whose members requested membership to pursue power within 
Congress (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997).26  
                                                 
24 http://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/ 
25 See Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2 for a list of all congressional committees that held hearings in the 
domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy areas and how each categorized. 
26 Deering and Smith (1997) only list power committees in the U.S. House of Representatives.  Here, a 
few Senate committees have been added as power committees given their important roles in the legislative 
process.  See Appendix A for a complete list and reasoning behind the departures from the existing 
literature. 
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Problem uncertainty is the final component of determining how congressional 
committees prioritize information.  To measure problem uncertainty, I used the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which was originally created as a measure of 
competition in economic markets.  The HHI is a measure of the size distribution of 
companies within a given market.  As HHI approaches zero, a market is characterized by 
a high number of companies of similar size.  The HHI increases as a result of two things: 
(1) a decrease in the number of firms within the market and (2) an increase in the size 
between the companies.27 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index translates here as a measure of problem 
uncertainty because when there is no “competition” among possible problem definitions 
(i.e. topics the committee holds hearings on in a given month) then there is no 
uncertainty.  A committee holds hearings on only one topic because it knows exactly 
what the problem is and is sure of its importance.  Therefore, the committee has little 
problem uncertainty.  
In contrast, when a congressional committee is holding hearings across a number 
of different topic areas in given month, there is lots of “competition” among problem 
definitions.  This “competition” among problem definitions and problem salience 
translates to higher uncertainty over the appropriate definition and level of importance to 
attach to a given problem.  High problem uncertainty characterizes a committee that is 
searching for information across a wide range of potential problem definitions.   
To calculate the HHI score to approximate problem uncertainty for each 
committee for each month, I used all hearings on all 20 policy areas in the Policy 
                                                 
27 In the past the HHI has been used in political science to measure the jurisdictions of congressional 
committees (see Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000) as well as political competition applied to 
major parties within a country (see Bardhan and Yang 2004).   
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Agenda’s Project Hearings Dataset from 1995-2010.28  Using all hearings on all topics 
to calculate problem uncertainty accounts for the competition among all problem 
definitions, rather than limiting uncertainty to those definitions routinely used by the 
three subsystems highlighted in this study.  Including all problem definitions in the 
calculations allows me to better account for both congressional committee attention 
limits and competing problem definitions that cross policy subsystems.  For example, 
environmental concerns and energy from fossil fuels are two potential problem 
definitions that are not relegated to a single subsystem. 
The following three chapters investigate the supply and prioritization of 
information in domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy areas.   The first of 
these chapters look at bureaucrats as information suppliers and, specifically, whether or 
not they have an information advantage in these three policy areas.  Findings suggest (1) 
that congressional committees adjust how they prioritize bureaucrats as information 
suppliers at hearings depending on the policy area being discussed and (2) as 
committees become more uncertain about the problem, they rely more heavily on federal 
bureaucrats, specifically careerists.  Both of these findings support the new approach of 
information prioritization introduced in this chapter.   The second finding, the number of 
bureaucrats testifying increases with committees’ problem uncertainty, supports the 
claim that bureaucrats have an inherent information advantage given their unique 
relationship with Congress. 
The final two chapters look at private sources of information (businesses and 
interest groups) and public sources of information (bureaucrats, members of Congress, 
and states and localities) testifying at energy hearings.  These chapters focus on when 
                                                 
28 See Appendix D for more information on calculating the HHI for each congressional committee for 
each month during the 1995-2010 time period. 
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different witness types are more or less likely to testify, paying particular attention to the 
presiding congressional committee and specific issue area.  The findings presented in 
these two chapters do not find additional support for committees’ information 
preferences but do find additional support for the bureaucratic information advantage, 
especially in times of problem uncertainty.  In addition, the findings of these two 
chapters support the claim that congressional committees prioritize different sources of 
information in policies with publics than in policies without publics.  In short, the 
findings presented in the next three chapters show support for the new approach to 




Chapter 4: Bureaucrats as Information Suppliers 
Federal bureaucrats play an important role in policy making as policy 
implementers and as members of policy subsystems, working with interest groups, 
businesses, and legislators (Kingdon 1984; Salisbury 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998).  In addition to implementing 
legislation, they also establish policy alternatives (Kingdon 1984), including problem 
definitions, possible solutions, and policy advocacy, by providing Congress with 
valuable information.   
Much of the research on the federal bureaucracy focuses on bureaucrats as agents 
of Congress, the president, or both and as policy implementers.  There is an abundance 
of literature dedicated to understanding bureaucrats as implementers (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1973; Rein and Rabinowitz 1978; Lipsky 1980; Sabatier 1986; Wilson 1989; 
Cook 1996) and the ways in which Congress and the president attempt to control them 
(Moe 1985; Weaver 1987; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Balla 1998; Waterman and 
Meier 1998; Balla and Wright 2001; Worsham and Gatrell 2005).  While these studies 
of implementation and principal-agent theory often allude to the fact that bureaucrats 
possess expertise and vast amounts of valuable policy information (see especially: 
Kingdon 1984; Weaver 1987; and Brehm and Gates 1999), there are few studies which 
focus on when and to what extent bureaucrats supply Congress with information (a 
notable exception is Miller 2004).  This chapter seeks to do exactly that: investigate 
when bureaucrats are most likely to supply information to congressional committees and 
how the supply of information changes by committee, across policy areas, and in 
response to crises and problem uncertainty. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized into three sections.  The first section will 
provide a review of the three roles of federal bureaucrats: agents of Congress and the 
president, implementers, and, most importantly for this dissertation, information 
suppliers.  The second section of this chapter will discuss in detail the research questions 
regarding federal bureaucrats and, more specifically, careerists in the information supply 
process.  The final section will discuss the research and empirical findings on when and 
to what extent bureaucrats have an advantage in the information supply process. 
BUREAUCRATS IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
The policy specialization and accumulated knowledge of bureaucracies allow 
them to play a number of roles in the policy-making process as agents of Congress and 
the president, implementers, and information suppliers.  In the principal-agent theory, 
information asymmetry between Congress (or the president) and the bureaucracy often 
gives Congress (or the president) a disadvantage because of problems like moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  The principals do not have enough information regarding the 
policy problem and the actions of the agents, both of which help make controlling 
bureaucracies impossible and influencing bureaucracies difficult (Brehm and Gates 
1999, Moe 1985, McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).   
As implementers, bureaucrats use their policy expertise to take laws and translate 
them into action (Dodd and Schott 1979).  Bureaucrats are afforded more discretion as 
implementers when the members of Congress have little knowledge of an issue area or 
are require ambiguous legislation to satisfy a compromise.  In these situations, 
bureaucrats are often allowed often allowed greater discretion in the implementation 
process and, as a result much more power in determining policy outcomes (Huber and 
Shipan 2002).   
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Last, as information suppliers bureaucracies can use their accumulated 
knowledge and policy specialization to help define problems, structure debates, and 
advocate for specific policy solutions (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2005).  
The following section will review the extensive research on bureaucrats in the 
implementation and principal-agent literatures, paying particular attention to the 
information asymmetry between bureaucrats and Congress in these contexts.  The 
section will conclude with a discussion of bureaucrats as information suppliers given 
their inherent information-sharing advantage.   
Agents of Congress and the President 
In political science, the principal-agent theory is often used to describe the 
relationship between Congress or the president (the principal) and the federal 
bureaucracy (the agent(s)).  The principal-agent framework is best defined as a top-down 
approach to studying the bureaucracy, stressing the importance of subordination and 
compliance to the rules laid forth by Congress (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978).  The 
research in this area is often focused on how congress and/or the president can ensure 
bureaucratic compliance (Balla 1998; Balla and Wright 2001; McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Lewis 2008; Moe 1985) and bureaucratic 
response to such attempts at control (Brehm and Gates 1999; Golden 2000; Wilson 
1989).  In this framework, the bureaucracy is characterized as a means to an end (see 
Cook 1996). 
Congress has difficulty controlling the bureaucracy for a number of reasons, 
including the propensity for passing ambiguous legislation and the inability to monitor 
bureaucratic actions.  Ambiguous legislation (usually as the result of either a series of 
compromises or a lack of information) allows for agency discretion, taking policy 
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decisions out of the hands of principal(s) and giving them to the agency (Huber and 
Shipan 2002; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).    
Congress struggles to control the bureaucracy due to the inadequate resources to 
monitor the large, complex organizations.  Not only would monitoring the federal 
bureaucracy be extremely difficult, it would also be very costly to acquire the necessary 
information and resources (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1987).  The information asymmetry that exists between Congress and the 
bureaucracy makes control over bureaucrats even more problematic. Bureaucracies have 
policy specialization and accumulated knowledge that neither Congress nor the president 
possess.  This information asymmetry is exasperated by problems of adverse selection 
(the inability of the principal to have full information about the agent) and moral hazard 
(the inability of the principal to determine if the agent’s actions are in the principal’s 
best interests) (Brehm and Gates 1999; Moe 1985).   
The principal’s moral hazard, the possibility that the principal’s goals are self-
destructive, is another obstacle for controlling bureaucracies (Miller 2005).  Sometimes 
a decision that seemingly goes against the principal’s interests is necessary for reaching 
long term policy goals (Miller 2005).  The solution to this problem is to allow 
bureaucrats to make policy decisions based on their specialization and accumulated 
knowledge.  When principals are confronted with questions of personal moral hazard or 
pass ambiguous legislation, then the delegation of policy decisions to bureaucrats is 
often the only available option for policymaking. In fact, we see proof of this in the 
implementation literature—when neutrality or additional expertise is needed Congress 
and the President turn to the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002).     
Given these many challenges to controlling the bureaucracy, it is not in the best 
interests of the principals to even try to control the bureaucracy; instead Congress and 
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the president must use their power to influence bureaucratic behavior.  The two main 
ways Congress can attempt to control or influence bureaucratic behavior is through the 
use of ex post and ex ante controls.  Ex post controls are those implemented after the 
fact, including what McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) term policy patrols and fire 
alarms.  Police patrols are direct forms of oversight in which Congress is actively 
observing agencies to ensure that each one is acting the way Congress would want 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Fire alarms, on the other hand, allow Congress to use 
rules and procedures in administration that allow citizens and interest groups to patrol 
agencies and sound an alarm when there is a problem (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).   
Ex ante controls are best understood as the actual agency structure and decision-
making process to ensure the best possible outcome and to restrict an agency before it 
becomes involved in policy making (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989).  The use of 
such ex ante controls allows Congress to create an “early warning” system to alert them 
when an agency veers off course.  Furthermore, adding more decision-making rules 
provides Congress with extra time if they do need to intervene. An additional advantage 
of ex ante controls is that it allows Congress to “stack the deck in favor of certain 
constituents” (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989).  
The president, too, has strategies for controlling the administrative branch.  Each 
agency, though, has its own agenda, support base, and knowledge advantage meaning 
that the president cannot expect control to come easily (Moe 1985; Jones and Williams 
2008).  In order to achieve responsive competence from the bureaucracy, the president 
will centralize control in the White House and maximize presidential appointments 
(Moe 1985).  Political appointees represent the greatest source of bureaucratic control 
for presidents (Lewis 2008). Through the careful use of appointees, the president can 
shape agencies within his administration (Lewis 2008).  
 69 
Even though Congress and the president have a variety of tools they can use to 
direct bureaucratic behavior, often they find that they need to give bureaucrats more 
freedom to act rather than less.   Congress and the president both rely on the bureaucracy 
to interpret and implement ambiguous legislation, making decisions Congress is either 
unable or unwilling to make (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Bureaucracies are able to 
assume this responsibility because of their policy specialization and accumulated 
knowledge.  Further, Congress and the president are able to trust them with this 
responsibility because of their expertise, but also because they are constrained by what 
Wilson (1989) calls the bureaucratic personality (the agency’s standard operating 
procedures, prior experience, and professional norms).   
Implementers 
Once legislation is passed, it must be implemented.  There are two approaches to 
studying implementation: top-down or bottom-up.  The top-down approach is reflective 
of the principal-agent framework.  This characterization of implementation assumes that 
once the objectives are set forth in legislation there will be relatively few decisions to be 
made.  The policy will easily be translated into action, achieving congressional policy 
objectives (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Rein and Rabinovitz 1978).  However, this 
approach oversimplifies the process of implementation because legislation is rarely 
specific enough to allow for it (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978).   
The bottom-up approach recognizes the importance of bureaucrats in the 
implementation process.  In this approach, implementation is characterized as a circular, 
rather than linear, process in which bureaucrats have a significant role in both decision 
making and implementation (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978).  The bottom-up approach is 
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much more accurate given the frequency with which Congress passes ambiguous 
legislation. 
There are two paths that Congress can take in designing legislation, one that 
constrains administrators, treating them as merely agents, or one that delegates authority 
to the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Long statues are usually extremely 
detailed, meant to micromanage the bureaucracy throughout the implementation process.  
Ambiguous statues, on the other hand, neglect policy details and give bureaucrats 
discretion in the implementation process (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Giving bureaucrats 
policy discretion can be, and often is, a deliberate act by Congress.  Delegating 
important decisions to the bureaucracy is often the best strategy for ensuring that the 
policy is effectively implemented because bureaucrats have both policy specialization 
and accumulated knowledge (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Discretion can also be the result 
of the inability of the principals to compromise on legislation (Huber and Shipan 2002).   
Whether Congress chooses to delegate authority to bureaucrats in the 
implementation process is depended on a number of things, including the level of policy 
conflict, legislative capacity in a given issue area, and transaction cost politics (Huber 
and Shipan 2002; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  Highly contentious policies are 
difficult to make detailed for a number of reasons, including inability to compromise and 
the fear of making a mistake (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Further, many times Congress 
lacks the information necessary to write detailed legislation, especially in issue areas 
such as energy policy (see Grossman 2013).   
In both the principal-agent and implementation literatures, it is repeatedly shown 
that Congress must delegate many policy decisions to bureaucrats because of their 
inherent information advantages (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 
2002).  Given the importance of the bureaucracy in the implementation stage of the 
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policy process because of its policy specialization and accumulated knowledge it makes 
sense that we should also concern ourselves with how this same bureaucratic expertise 
can impact earlier stages of the policy process, specifically the problem definition stage.   
Information Suppliers 
Bureaucracies collect information that benefits them not only in making 
decisions during the implementation process, but also to use at other points throughout 
the policy process (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Katzmann 1989; Feldman and 
March 1981).  While research tends to focus on bureaucratic expertise in the two areas 
previously discussed, federal bureaucrats are involved throughout the policy process, 
especially during the problem definition stage (Kingdon 1984; Katzmann 1989; Miller 
2004; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).   
Problem definition is usually considered the first stage of the policy process.  It 
is the process in which a phenomenon is labeled as a problem that requires the 
government to take some sort of action (see Cobb and Elder 1972; Stone 1989; Jones 
and Baumgartner 1989; Kingdon 1984).  According to the punctuated equilibrium theory 
major policy change only occurs once congressional attention is shifted to a new issue(s) 
due to a change in the problem definition or as a result of an exogenous shock (ex. the 
Three Mile Island accident in 1979) (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).   
Both the principal-agent and implementation literatures focus on congressional 
delegation of policy decisions to the federal bureaucracy.  The pluralistic theory of 
information processing suggests that just as much attention should be shown to the 
delegation information processing: both the monitoring of the policy environment and 
the processing of subsequently gathered information (see Workman, Jones, and Jochim 
2009).  Rather than characterizing the relationship between Congress and the 
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bureaucracy as predominantly top-down, the information processing perspective stresses 
the reciprocal aspect of the relationship (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  The 
federal bureaucracy is seen as a collection of organizations that monitor the policy 
environment and direct congressional attention to potential policy problems (Workman, 
Jones, and Jochim 2009; Arrow 1974; Feldman and March 1981; May, Workman, and 
Jones 2008; Workman 2015).  
The information gathered and processed by bureaucracies is often used by 
Congress to define problems and establish policy alternatives (Kingdon 1984; Miller 
2004; Baumgartner and Jones 2005).  The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is 
an excellent example of exactly this type of congressional delegation as it is charged 
with both policy surveillance (see Feldman and March 1981) and identifying and 
defining policy problems (see Katzmann 1989).  In his study of energy policy failures, 
Grossman (2013) notes that the EIA was created in 1974 (originally as the Federal 
Energy Administration) for the purpose of providing Congress with information 
regarding the energy industry.  Likewise, Miller’s study (2004) of criminal justice policy 
shows that bureaucrats play a role in defining policy problems and alternatives in 
criminal justice policy.  
Federal bureaucracies gather information in “surveillance” mode (Feldman and 
March 1981; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009) constantly monitoring changes in the 
policy environment.  The EIA, for example, regularly publishes a variety of measures of 
the state of energy policy, including the amounts of energy produced and consumed by 
source and prices by source.  In turn, this information can be used to define emerging 
problems and redefine existing ones (Katzmann 1989; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 
2009).   
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The ability of the federal bureaucracy to gather, process, and disseminate 
information to direct macro attention is particularly important given the attention limits 
of Congress.    Congress has limited time and resources to make policy.  More 
specifically, members of Congress have attention limits and can only focus on a few 
problems at any given time (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Congress relies on 
subsystem actors, especially bureaucrats to survey the policy environment and alert them 
to potential problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Feldman and March 1981; 
Workman 2015).  There are an extensive number of agencies created for policy 
surveillance and information gathering (ex. Energy Information Administration; U.S. 
Census; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) (Feldman and March 1981).  
Rather than describing the relationship between Congress and the federal 
bureaucracy as a top-down, control-driven process or as a bottom-up, expertise-driven 
process, it is more accurate to characterize the relationship as reciprocal.  Congress 
needs information for policy making and help with policy surveillance.  Bureaucrats 
need access to policymakers.  Bureaucrats provide necessary information and policy 
surveillance services and congressional committees attend to bureaucrats’ messages, 
frequently inviting them to testify and, thereby, providing them access to the policy 
process.   
BUREAUCRATS AS INFORMATION SUPPLIERS 
In order to gather the information necessary for policy making, congressional 
committees must look to subsystem actors.  In instances where problems are well-
defined and information is limited, committees solicit information from a narrow set of 
experts (Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  In most instances, though, where problems are 
highly dimensional and information is abundant, congressional committees will engage 
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in information prioritization.  That is, a committee looks to a broad range of information 
suppliers and decides who to attend and who to ignore.  This chapter is focused on the 
second information gathering strategy: information prioritization.   
Information prioritization is an information gather strategy employed by 
congressional committees when problems are multidimensional and information is 
abundant.  This information gathering strategy is consistent with the pluralistic 
information processing framework discussed in the previous chapters.  Subsystem actors 
compete to supply information to Congress and committees prioritize information from 
a broad range of sources. 
Information Advantage of Bureaucrats 
Bureaucrats have a unique advantage in the information supply process, which 
makes them more likely to be prioritized when Congress is most uncertain about the 
policy problem.  In the face of high problem uncertainty (the inability to define a 
problem or identify its most important dimension), Congress needs accurate, reliable, 
and stable information to help define the issue at hand.   
Bureaucrats are often considered the most accurate source of information 
because their information collection is directed by law (see Carlson 2011; Workman 
2015).  While there is still a distinct possibility of bureaucrats supplying biased 
information (especially for expanded budgets (see King 1997; Dery 1984), these biases 
are much more easily accounted for than biases from private groups given the repeated 
interactions between Congress and the administration.  Bureaucrats, especially 
careerists, have repeated interactions over the course of their careers with members of 
congressional committees and the committees’ staffs.   These long term relationships 
and the relative lack of competition among bureaucracies also allow bureaucrats to 
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establish reputation as reliable (predictable) and stable sources of information and 
expertise.   
Bureaucrats’ lack of competition relative to their private counterparts also 
increases the likelihood that an agency may hold an information monopoly.  For 
instance, there is only one agency capable of regulating domestic nuclear energy, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (www.nrc.gov).  In the private sector, on the other 
hand, many companies and interest groups compete in a given industry or policy 
domain.  As a result of low competition for agencies, it is more likely that bureaucrats 
hold an information monopoly in a given policy area.  In highly regulated policy areas, 
such nuclear energy and bioterrorism, private companies and groups have little access to 
information.  In other areas, like banking, bureaucracies are only one of many types of 
institutions with policy-relevant information.   
This chapter sets out to investigate the information advantage of bureaucrats.  
Specifically, are bureaucrats more likely to testify when congressional committees are 
uncertain about the problem?  Across all policy areas, congressional committees are 
expected to invite more bureaucrats to testify at hearings as the problem uncertainty 
increases.  As a committees becomes more uncertain about which problem is important 
or which dimension of a problem is most important, bureaucrats should become more 
prevalent at hearings.  This trend should be especially true for careerist bureaucrats, 
those bureaucrats hired on merit, who have spent years working in specific policy area, 
garnering extensive policy-specific expertise and knowledge.  In policy areas where 
bureaucrats are more likely to hold information monopolies are they more likely to 
testify at congressional hearings?  As mentioned in the previous chapter, bureaucrats are 
expected to testify more in health and energy policy areas because those are the issues in 
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which we are most likely to see agencies with information monopolies.  The NRC in 
energy policy and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in health policy.  
RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
Many times bureaucracies are created for the purpose of information gathering.  
The U.S. Census, the U.S. of Labor Statistics, and the Energy Information 
Administration are all great examples of agencies created to supply information to 
Congress and the president.  The above sections have argued that bureaucrats have an 
information advantage not just because Congress has created them for that purpose, but 
also because of repeated interactions between the two institutions, the long-term stability 
of federal agencies, and the relative lack of competition among bureaucracies.  The rest 
of this chapter is devoted to empirically exploring the information advantage of 
bureaucrats by outlining the data collection and coding processes, reviewing the research 
design, and then presenting and discussing the findings.  
Hearings Data 
To explore the idea of a bureaucratic information advantage, 4,745 congressional 
committee hearings on domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy areas were 
collected using the Policy Agendas Project’s Congressional Hearings Dataset.29  Using 
this set of hearings, all 33,090 witnesses testifying at these hearings were collected and 
coded according to the institution with which they are affiliated: public institution, 
government entity, business, or interest group.  Government witnesses were additionally 
coded as to whether they represent a sub-national government or federal bureaucracy or 
if they are a member of Congress. 
                                                 
29 Policyagendas.org  
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The analysis presented in this chapter is interested in bureaucrats30 testifying at 
hearings in these policy areas.  The analysis here explores not only whether or not 
bureaucrats have an information advantage when Congress faces problem uncertainty, 
but also if there is a difference between careerists and appointees as information 
suppliers.  The Plum Books31 from 1992-2008 were used to identify which witness are 
careerists and which are presidential appointees.  Those bureaucrats that are listed as 
presidentially appointed by the Plum Book as well as those that served on White House 
advisory boards were coded as appointed.  Bureaucrats with a career appointment listed 
in the Plum Book or with a position not listed in the Plum Book were coded as 
careerists.32   
  
                                                 
30 Witnesses coded as bureaucrats were broadly defined to included not only those representing federal 
administrative agencies, but also those represented federally sponsored institutions like national 
laboratories, White House Task Forces, congressional agencies, and federal judges.  While obviously not 
all of these groups are traditionally defined as bureaucrats (especially, federal judges), they fit most 
closely within this witness category.   
31 United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (Plum Book), 1992-2008 published by the 
U.S. Government Publishing Office. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/content-
detail.html 
32 The “Other” category contains those witnesses who had temporary or former appointments to 
bureaucracies, work for congressional agencies (ex. Congressional Budget Office), federal judges, and 
institutions with congressional charters (ex. national labs, task forces, veterans’ groups).  
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Table 9: Types of Bureaucrats Testifying by Policy Area, 1995-2010 
 
 Table 9 shows the types of bureaucrats testifying by policy area from 1995 to 
2010.  In both the domestic commerce and energy policy areas, presidential appointees 
and careerists are fairly equally represented as information suppliers at congressional 
hearings.  In health care, though, careerists account for over three times as many witness 
appearances as presidential appointees.  In all three policy areas, “Other” bureaucrats 
make up a fraction of witnesses testifying at committee hearings.    
There are three independent variables of interest: policy area, committee type, 
and problem uncertainty.  Policy area is determined according to the Policy Agendas 
Project’s content coding scheme.  The scheme is consistent over time and across 
institutions.  The three policy areas chosen, domestic commerce, energy, and health 
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care, allow for great variation in not only the participates (committees and witnesses), 
but also issue context.   
As mentioned previously, different policy areas have different prevailing weights 
for prioritizing the dimensions of a problem.  Energy policy is characterized by high 
dimensionality, with members of Congress weighting problem dimensions on the basis 
of regional, constituency, and ideological concerns (see Jochim and Jones 2013).  Health 
care policy, though, is considered to have low dimensionality given its tendency to be 
weighted on the basis of ideology alone.  Domestic commerce policy falls somewhere 
between the two (see Jochim and Jones 2013).  Also, due to some policy areas being 
highly regulated, such as nuclear energy production, bureaucrats have a natural 
information monopoly. 
Congressional committees seem to invite bureaucrats at equal rates across the 
three policy areas according to Table 10.  From 1995-2010, 3,158 bureaucrats testified 
in domestic commerce policy, roughly 27.9 percent of all witnesses testifying in that 
policy area.  In energy and health care policy areas, bureaucrats made up 27.4 and 28.1 
percent of all witnesses testifying, respectively, during the same time frame.  This table 
suggests that congressional committees prioritize bureaucrats equally across policy 
areas.   





Percent of Total 
Witnesses
Domestic Commerce 3158 27.9
Energy 1578 27.4
Health Care 3611 28.1
0.0
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Congressional committees are the second independent variable of note.  
Applying the framework laid out by Fenno (1973) and Deering and Smith (1997), the 
committers were coded based on their overarching goals.  A member of Congress 
requests a committee assignment that will facilitate his or her priorities: reelection 
through committee service, making good public policy, or gaining power and prestige.  
Because all members choose a given committee for a similar reason, each committee 
will have an overarching goal.  That goal will influence how the committee prioritizes 
information.  A committee focused on power will prioritize powerful sources of 
information: fellow members of Congress and high ranking (usually presidentially 
appointed) bureaucrats.  The following table shows the total number of bureaucrats 
testifying by committee type form 1995-2010.  According to Table 11, 27.0 percent of 
all witnesses invited to testify by constituency committees are federal bureaucrats.  This 
numbers is higher than those for both policy and power committees.   
Table 11: The Number of Bureaucrats Testifying by Committee Type from 1995 to 2010 
 
Figure 4 shows bureaucrats testifying as a percent of all witnesses in each policy 
area by committee type from 1995-2010.  The rates at which bureaucrats are invited in 
these three policy areas, domestic commerce, energy, and health care, seem to be less 
distinguishable by committee type than expected.  In domestic commerce policy, 










hearings held by power committees.  This is not in accordance with expectations of 
power committees’ information preferences for federal bureaucrats.  Constituency 
committees, in domestic commerce policy invite a similar percentage of bureaucrats.  
Between 10 and 20 percent of all witnesses testifying before constituency committees 
are federal bureaucrats.  This does reflect the expected information preferences of 
constituency committees, which should prefer constituency and clientele groups over 
other witness types.  In domestic commerce policy, between 25 and 40 percent of all 
witnesses testifying at policy committee hearings are bureaucrats.   This percentage is 
probably higher than expected given policy committees’ preferences for partisan groups.   
In energy, bureaucrats only account for roughly 20 to 50 percent of witnesses in 
policy and constituency committees.  Lower percentages of bureaucrats testifying 
supports expectations that policy and constituency committees prioritize partisan and 
clientele groups, respectively, more so than bureaucrats.  Power committees in energy 
policy do not always prioritize bureaucrats at high rates, but there are major spikes in 
1995, 1998, and 2010.  (There are no energy hearings in 1996, 2002, 2003, and 2009.) 
In health care policy, bureaucrats are prioritized at the lowest rates by these three 
committee types.  It is especially interesting to note that power committees prioritize 
fewer bureaucrats relative to the total witnesses over time, with fewer than 15 percent of 
witnesses being bureaucrats in 2009 and 2010.  Constituency and policy committees 
both prioritize bureaucrats at fairly low rates with less than 45 percent for constituency 
committees and less than 30 percent for policy committees.   
The final independent variable of interest is problem uncertainty.  Problem 
uncertainty is a measure of how sure a congressional committee is of the problem 
definition (See Figure 3 in Chapter Three).  Committees with high uncertainty are 
looking across multiple issue areas to determine the problem or its most important 
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attributes.  Committees with low uncertainty are focused on a single, specific policy 
area.  Committees need accurate, reliable, and stable sources of information to cope with 
problem uncertainty and, therefore, invite more federal bureaucrats (especially 
careerists) to testify.  Problem uncertainty is calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index using all hearings held from 1995-2010.  (Please see the discussion in 
Appendix D for how it was calculated.)   
Figure 5 shows the average problem uncertainty in each policy area by 
committee over this time frame.  The uncertainty is measured as one being complete 
uncertainty and zero being complete certainty.  The figure shows clear differences 
between bureaucrats testifying at committee hearings both across policy and committee 
type.  The average problem uncertainty at a hearing in each policy area by committee 
from 1995-2010.  In domestic commerce policy, power committees have the highest 
levels of uncertainty; whereas constituency committees have the lowest.  Other than the 







































































































In energy policy, power committees’ uncertainty seems to go down over time, 
with uncertainty measuring at 0.8 in 1995 and about 0.6 in 2010.  Constituency 
committees’ uncertainty remains stable at about 0.6 over this time, but policy 
committees’ uncertainty decreases overtime.  Uncertainty in health care policy fairly 
stable during this time frame.  There is an uptick in uncertainty in this policy area in 
2009 and 2010 for both policy and power committees.  This uncertainty could be due to 
health care reform and committees struggling to define and structure the health care 
policy debates. 
Figure 5 shows that overall averages of uncertainty are fairly stable by 
committee types across policy areas from one year to the next.  Further analysis is 
necessary to determine how month to month changes in uncertainty can affect 
committees’ information preferences.  There is some evidence in Figures 4 and 5 that 
this may be the case.  In health care, for example, there are upticks in uncertainty in 
2009 and 2010 in Figure 5 and increases in the percentage of bureaucrats testifying in 































































































In addition to these three key independent variables, several control variables 
were collected including those to gage hearing type, party, and chamber.  A fixed-effects 
variable was added to control for changes over time.  Variables for congressional 
chamber (62.6 percent of hearings were held by the House), majority party of chamber 
(Republican majorities account for 65.5 percent of hearings), and unified government 
(46.1 percent of hearings were held during unified government) control for differences 
in chamber, party, and political environment.    Lame duck presidential status, coded as 
the last two years of a president’s second term was also accounted for and represents 31 
percent of hearings.  Differences in hearing types: appropriations versus non-
appropriations and referral versus oversight were also identified.  Appropriations 
hearings account for 0.04 percent of hearings; whereas, referral account for 16 percent of 
hearings.  Last the total number of non-bureaucrat witnesses were noted in order to 
ensure that more bureaucrats were not testifying simply because committees were 
inviting more witnesses generally. 
Findings 
Using the data described above, negative binomial regression was employed to 
model the relationship between bureaucrats testifying and the policy area, committee 
preferences, and problem uncertainty.  Negative binomial models are appropriate for this 
study given the dependent variable is a count of bureaucrats testifying at a given 
hearing.  This model controls for the overdispersed nature of the data that a simpler 
count model (i.e. Poisson) could not.  The first model gages the differences in 
bureaucrats testifying across policy area, committee type, and uncertainty.   
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To refresh, based on the theory of pluralistic information supply and this new 
approach to information prioritization presented previously, we should expect to see the 
following: 
 
1: The number of federal bureaucrats invited to testify at congressional 
committee hearings varies by both policy area reflecting the likelihood of 
bureaucrats having information monopolies.   
1a: Bureaucrats are less likely to testify at hearings on domestic 
commerce than at hearings on energy or health care. 
2: Power committees invite more bureaucrats to testify relative to the 
other committee types because bureaucrats hold information most likely 
to help committees achieve their goals and complete their oversight tasks. 
3:  All committees with problem uncertainty prioritize bureaucrats as 
sources of information. 
Figure 6 shows the findings for the first negative binomial model which 
estimates the number of bureaucrats33 testifying at committee hearings.  (Full regression 
results are presented in Table E1 in Appendix E).  The dots on the coefficient plot 
represent the point estimates of the coefficients; whereas, the lines represent 95 percent 
confidence intervals for each estimate.  If the confidence interval does not cross the 
vertical line at zero, the coefficient is statistically significant.  The baseline policy area 
and committee type is business regulation and constituency committees, respectively.  
Overall, these results show that the number of bureaucrats testifying at congressional 
committee hearings varies by policy area, committee type, and in regards to problem 
uncertainty.   
  
                                                 




Figure 6: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Federal Bureaucrats Testifying at a 
Committee Hearing, 1995-2010 
First, there are clear differences across policy areas in terms of how many 
bureaucrats are invited to testify at a given hearing.  Specifically, bureaucrats are least 
likely to testify in domestic commerce policy, most likely due to the fact that 
bureaucracies in this policy area are less likely to hold information unavailable to other 
types of information suppliers.  In health care and energy policy areas, more 
bureaucracies are likely to testify at committees hearings.  In these policy areas, 
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bureaucrats are much more likely to hold information that is unavailable to private 
businesses or interest groups.  Nuclear energy and bioterrorism are two great examples 
of where private institutions and organizations are much less likely to have the 
information necessary for policy making.   
Second, there are also clear differences in the number of bureaucrats testifying at 
a congressional committee hearing across committee types: constituency, policy, and 
power committees.  When interacting policy area and committee type, it appears that 
committees vary how they prioritize information by policy area.  Power committees in 
domestic commerce policy invite the least number of bureaucrats to testify.  This finding 
is counter to expectations that power committees would favor bureaucrats given their 
interest in bureaucratic oversight as well as prioritizing key policy players (i.e. 
department secretaries).  Policy committees in domestic commerce invite the most 
bureaucrats to testify at a given committee hearing.  Policy committees are expected to 
favor partisan sources of information, so it is not totally unexpected that they would 
prioritize bureaucrats as sources of information, especially presidentially appointed 
bureaucrats.  Presidentially appointed bureaucrats provide partisan cues in addition to 
their policy-related testimony.   
On the topic of health care policy, policy committees invite less bureaucrats to 
testify than the other two committee types.  The findings for health care do not really 
align with the prior expectations of how committees prioritize information.  Policy 
committees are most likely to prioritize partisan sources of information, which would 
mean less space for bureaucrats, especially careerists.  However, power committees and 
constituency committee prioritize bureaucrats roughly the same rates.  This finding is 
consistent with expectations that policy committees would prioritize bureaucrats the 
most, given their task of overseeing the administrative agencies.   
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The findings for energy policy most closely follow the prior expectations for 
committee’s information preferences.  On the topic of energy, policy committees invite 
the least bureaucrats to testify which makes sense given their tendency to prioritize 
partisan sources of information. Power committees, though, invite the most bureaucrats 
to testify, which, again, is reflective of the fact that they are concerned with bureaucratic 
oversight.   
Third, as problem uncertainty increases so too does the number of bureaucrats 
invited to testify at a congressional committee hearing, regardless of both policy area 
and committee type.  This finding supports the idea of bureaucrats having an 
information advantage, especially when committees are struggling to define problems.  
Bureaucrats have long standing relationships with committees, with repeated 
interactions, and lack the competition that private institutions face in the market.  These 
characteristics encourage congressional committees to rely on bureaucrats more heavily 
for information, especially during times of uncertainty. 
To assure that more bureaucrats are invited to testify during times of problem 
uncertainty and not just more witnesses generally, the model controls for the total 
number of non-bureaucrats testifying at each hearing.  While the total number of non-
bureaucrats testifying does have a statistically significant effect on the number of 
bureaucrats testifying at a congressional hearing, the magnitude is tiny.  Congressional 
committees are not just inviting more witnesses when they are faced with problem 
uncertainty.  Committees are, in fact, targeting federal bureaucrats.   
The model also controls for several factors, such as time, hearing type, and party 
variables.  In terms of time, the findings suggest that over years the number bureaucrats 
invited to testify decreases.  This is congruent with recent work that suggests politics are 
becoming more and more structured by partisan frameworks (see Theriault 2013).  As 
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Theriault (2013) points out in his study of the Senate, Congress has become more 
polarized over time, with many policy decisions driven by ideology.  As policy making 
is increasingly structured by partisan frameworks, it becomes more likely that 
committees will focus on partisan sources rather than policy sources of information (see 
Rich 2004). 
The number of bureaucrats testifying also varies by hearing type.  Appropriations 
hearings, which focus on funding the federal bureaucracy, have more bureaucrats testify 
at them than other hearings types.  Referral hearings on legislation, on the other hand, 
have fewer bureaucrats as witnesses than other hearing types.  Intuitively, both of these 
findings are expected.  Appropriations hearings will naturally require lots of 
bureaucratic expertise, as will non-legislative hearings (oversight hearings).  Both of 
these hearings focus specifically on the federal bureaucracy.  Referral hearings, though, 
focus on legislation and require less bureaucracy-specific expertise.  
In terms of the relationship between party and the number of bureaucrats 
testifying, it appears that Republicans invite fewer bureaucrats to testify than Democrats.  
Democrats are often thought of as being in favor of expanding the size and role of the 
federal bureaucracy so this finding is not unexpected.  Also, during lame duck sessions 
of the president, more bureaucrats are invited to testify.  This finding most likely reflects 
increased oversight of the bureaucracy leading up to elections, such as the Benghazi 
hearings and the investigations of Hillary Clinton.   
The last interesting finding is that the House, in general, invites more bureaucrats 
to testify than does the Senate.  The House has less resources for its members in terms of 
staff, but also House members are limited by two year terms and lengthy reelection 
campaigns.  These factors leave little time and resources to allow House members to 
become policy experts on the same level as their Senate counterparts.  The House’s 
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greater reliance on bureaucrats’ expertise may be one way House members make up for 
their time and resource deficiency.     
Since the findings of negative binomial models cannot be directly interpreted, the 
predicted probabilities for the most important variables: policy area, committee type, 
and problem uncertainty are show in Figures 7 and 8.  Figure 7 shows the predicted 
probability for the number of bureaucrats testifying at committee hearings given policy 
area and changes in problem uncertainty.  The three policy areas are represented by the 
three lines with bands representing their 95 percent confidence intervals.  Keep in mind 
while reading the graphic, an average number of only seven witnesses testify at a given 
hearing so two bureaucrats testifying represents 28.6 percent of the witness panel.   
As uncertainty increases from zero (total certainty) to one (total uncertainty), the 
number of bureaucrats invited to testify in each policy are increases at roughly the same 
rate.  As expected, fewer bureaucrats testify in domestic commerce policy than in energy 
and health care policy areas. 
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Figure 7: Predicted Number of Bureaucrats Testifying at Domestic Commerce, Energy, 
and Health Congressional Committee Hearings as Uncertainty Increases 
Figure 8 shows the predicted number of bureaucrats testifying at hearings by 
constituency, policy, and power committees and changes in problem uncertainty.  The 
baseline policy used here, again, is domestic commerce policy.  As the above figure 
shows, the fewest bureaucrats testify in this policy area.  All three committees invite 
more bureaucrats to testify as problem uncertainty increases.  Policy committees are 
predicted to invite the most bureaucrats to testify at hearings, which again is not 
completely unexpected.  Presidentially appointed bureaucrats can provide the partisan 
information that policy committees tend to prefer.  It is unexpected that power 




Figure 8: Predicted Number of Bureaucrats Testifying at Constituency, Policy, and 
Power Committees as Uncertainty Increases, 1995-2010 
 Many of the findings presented so far supports the idea of an information 
advantage of federal bureaucrats, especially in terms of problem uncertainty.  Careerist 
bureaucrats, though, should have a greater information advantage than their 
presidentially appointed counterparts given their longer tenures with the agencies as well 
as their professional training and expertise.  Because of the differences between these 
two types of federal bureaucrats, the model was rerun predicting the number of careerist 
bureaucrats testifying across policy areas, committee types, and in response to problem 
uncertainty.   Below are the expectations expressed previously: 
 
3a: Careerist bureaucrats are more preferred than their presidentially 
appointed counterparts during times of uncertainty because of greater 
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levels of expertise and longer relationships with congressional 
committees.   
Figure 9 displays the findings for the negative binomial model predicting the 
number of careerist bureaucrats34 testifying at a given committee hearing.  (Full 
regression results are presented in Table E1 in Appendix E).  The dots on the coefficient 
plot are interpreted exactly as before with the coefficients represented by the dots and 
the 95 percent confidence intervals represented by the lines.  If the confidence intervals 
do not cross the vertical line at zero, the coefficients are statistically significant.  The 
baseline for policy area and committee type is, again, business regulation and 
constituency committees, respectively.  Again, these findings show that the number of 
careerist bureaucrats testifying at congressional committee hearings varies by policy 
area, committee type, and in regards to problem uncertainty. 
                                                 
34 Only those bureaucrats with either career appointments or merit based positions.  This does not 
included any of the presidentially appointed bureaucrats or any that fall into the “other” category.   
 96 
 
Figure 9: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Careerist Bureaucrats Testifying at 
a Committee Hearing 
Uncertainty remains positively and significantly associated with the number of 
bureaucrats testifying at a committee hearing.  In fact the magnitude of the coefficient 
even appears to increase in this model.  It appears that when committees are 
experiencing problem uncertainty that they invite more bureaucrats to testify, especially 
careerist bureaucrats.  Careerist bureaucrats tend to have longer relationships with the 
congressional committees given their much longer tenures.  Careerists’ often work for 
the same agency for decades; whereas, presidentially appointed bureaucrats often serve 
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for only four to eight years.  Further, careerist bureaucrats were hired based on their 
professional training.  Presidentially appointed bureaucrats may or may not be experts in 
the policy field in which they work.  Michael D. Brown, the director of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency during the Hurricane Katrina crisis, is an excellent 
example of a presidentially appointed bureaucrat who was not well-qualified for his 
position.  These key differences between careerists and presidentially appointed 
bureaucrats appear to amplify the information advantages of the careerist bureaucrats.   
 
 
Figure 10: Predicted Number of Careerist Bureaucrats Testifying at Domestic, Energy, 
and Health Congressional Committee Hearings as Uncertainty Increases 
Again, as the findings of negative binomial models cannot be directly 
interpreted, the predicted probabilities for committee type and problem uncertainty are 
show in Figure 10.  Figure 10 displays the predicted probability for the number of 
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careerist bureaucrats testifying at committee hearings in each policy area given changes 
in problem uncertainty.  The three policy areas are represented by the three lines with 
bands representing their 95 percent confidence intervals.  Keep in mind while reading 
the graphic, an average number of only seven witnesses testify at a given hearing so one 
careerist bureaucrat testifying represents roughly fourteen percent of the witness panel.   
As uncertainty increases from zero (total certainty) to one (total uncertainty), the 
number of careerist bureaucrats invited to testify in each energy and commerce increases 
at roughly the same rate.  Overall, more careerist bureaucrats testify in health care policy 
than in energy and domestic commerce policy areas.  It seems that as uncertainty 
increases in health care policy, the number of careerist bureaucrats testifying increases at 
sharper rate.  At the highest level of uncertainty, roughly twenty percent of a hearing 
panel on health care policy is comprised of careerist bureaucrats.  
There are three other important differences between the two models. First, in 
domestic commerce policy, the policy committees do not invite more careerist 
bureaucrats compared to the other committees.  This finding suggests that the increased 
number of bureaucrats testifying at policy committee hearings from the previous model 
were a result of policy committees attending to presidentially appointed bureaucrats at 
higher rates.  Policy committees prefer information from partisan sources.  Presidentially 
appointed bureaucrats can not only provide expert information, but also partisan cues.   
Second, in energy policy, power committees do not invite more careerist 
bureaucrats than other committees, which is counter to the finding in the previous 
model.  This suggests that the previous finding, power committees in energy invite more 
bureaucrats to testify than other committees, was driven by presidentially appointed 
bureaucrats.  Since much of what power committees do is oversee the federal 
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bureaucracy, extra attention to those bureaucrats in charge of running the agencies is 
expected.  
Third, the model, again, suggests that the House of Representatives, in general, 
invites more careerist bureaucrats than the Senate.  In fact, when comparing this finding 
to that in the previous model, the magnitude of the coefficient is increased for careerist 
bureaucrats.  This finding suggests that House members rely more heavily on 
bureaucrats for policy expertise, especially careerist bureaucrats.  This finding provides 
more support for the theory of an information supply for bureaucrats, especially 
careerists, who should have an extra advantage given their professional training and 
longer tenures with their agencies. 
Conclusions 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the number of bureaucrats 
invited to testify at congressional committee hearings by policy area, committee type, 
and in response to problem uncertainty.  Bureaucrats are least likely to testify in 
domestic commerce, a policy area in which it is unlikely for a federal agency to have 
information that is unavailable to other information sources.   
Further, depending on the policy area, committees adjust how they search for 
information.  In domestic commerce policy, for example, policy committees invite 
higher numbers of bureaucrats than other committee types.  It appears that these policy 
committees are inviting high numbers of presidentially appointed bureaucrats, who are 
capable of supplying both technical expertise and partisan cues.  Policy committees in 
energy and health care, though, invite the fewest number of bureaucrats in these areas.  
This finding is also true for other committee types.  The rate at which committee types 
invite bureaucrats to testify varies by policy area.   
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The most interesting findings presented chapter are those supporting the notion 
of bureaucrats having an information advantage.  First, as a committee’s uncertainty 
about a problem increases, in invites more bureaucrats to testify.  This finding is 
magnified for careerist bureaucrats who have longer tenures with their agencies, longer 
standing relationships with Congress, and have received professional training in their 
particular fields.  Bureaucrats are also more likely to testify before the House, 
suggesting that members of the House rely on bureaucrats, especially careerist 
bureaucrats, to make up for less resources, time, and policy expertise relative to the 
Senate.   
This chapter focuses on the information advantage of bureaucrats, which the 
findings presented herein suggest exists.  However, the work by May (1991) on policies 
with public and those without publics suggests that other groups, both private and public 
institutions, can experience advantages, depending on the specific policy area.  The 
following two chapters investigate when different witness types are most likely to be 
prioritized in the various subsystems within energy policy.   
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Chapter 5: Prioritizing Private Sources of Information in Energy 
Policy 
One of the underlying assumptions of the pluralistic theory of information 
processing is that subsystem actors compete to supply information to Congress.  The 
subsystem actors, federal bureaucrats, interest groups, state and local governments, and 
businesses, want to supply information to help define problems and structure policy 
debates.   How a problem is defined structures how that policy area is discussed and 
which solutions are deemed viable.   
The subsystem actors are all motivated to define problems to shape the policy 
process to favor their preferences.  However, the underlying motivations differ by actor.  
Bureaucrats, for example, are often created for the sole purpose of gathering information 
for Congress.  In addition, gaining control of a policy area via problem redefinition can 
mean expanded budgets or jurisdictions (see King 1997 and Dery 1984).  In other 
instances, providing information may allow bureaucrats to protect their status quo 
jurisdictions (May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2009).   
The previous chapter showed evidence of bureaucrats, especially careerist 
bureaucrats, having an inherent information advantage.  In fact, as the problem 
uncertainty for a committee increases, so too does the number of bureaucrats testifying, 
especially careerists.  The bureaucrats’ information advantage appears to exist in all 
three policy areas.  Within these three areas, bureaucrats have the greatest advantage in 
health than the other policy areas.  Depending on the policy area, though, committees 
vary in how much they prioritize bureaucrats.  In energy policy, for example, policy 
committees are most likely to invite bureaucrats to testify.   
May (1991) argues that different subsystems will have different types of active 
coalitions.  For instance, policies with publics, such as gas and oil extraction, should 
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have diverse and active subsystems (May 1991).  Based on the pluralistic theory of 
information the actors within these subsystems are actively competing to supply 
information to Congress.  Policies without publics, which usually deal with technical 
issues or “public” risks (ex. nuclear energy), will have very limited coalitions that are 
usually limited to scientific experts.   
Only those available sources of information can be prioritized by committees.  
The available sources of information is partially based on whether the policies are with 
or without publics.  For policies with publics, diverse subsystem actors compete to 
supply information to Congress.  In these policies, there is a wider range of actors 
garnering attention than in policies without publics.  In those policy areas without 
publics, though, there are few actors capable of supplying information other than 
technical and policy experts, which will naturally be favored by congressional 
committees to supply information.   
This chapter and the one that follows will investigate when each type of witness 
is likely to have an information advantage or be Congress’s preferred source of 
information.   This chapter looks specifically at private witness types, businesses and 
interest groups, paying particular attention to businesses.  In the sections that follow, the 
motivations of actors to supply information, the information preferences of committees, 
and the characteristics of specific energy topics are discussed.  Final sections will 
investigate when businesses and interest groups are most likely to testify by committee 
type, energy topic, and problem uncertainty.  In short this chapter seeks to answer the 
following question: In which scenarios are private witnesses, businesses and interest 
groups, most likely to be prioritized as information suppliers? 
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INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ENERGY POLICY 
Within each subsystem, actors are motivated to share information with Congress 
to try to influence problem definitions, structure policy debates, and influence policy 
making.   The competition to supply information, either from a large, diverse set of 
actors in policies with public or from a more limited group of experts in policies without 
publics, requires Congress to sort through the available information and determine 
which sources should receive information and which should not.  Congress has two 
information gathering strategies, one of which, information prioritization, is best for 
dealing an abundance of available information.  Information prioritization requires that 
Congress choose from available sources who will be prioritized and receive 
congressional attention and who will not.  
Within energy policy, the nature of the policy determines which sources of 
information are most active within a subsystem and, therefore, which sources Congress 
can prioritize.  In policies with publics, Congress will have a greater variety of 
information sources from which to choose.  In policies without publics, though, 
bureaucrats and other technical experts are likely to dominate the information supply 
process.   
The goals of each committee (constituency service, making public policy, and 
gaining power within the chamber) determine which sources of information (e.g. 
bureaucrats, interest groups, business representatives) are most likely to receive 
attention. In policies with publics these goals are going to be even more important in 
determining who testifies given the large, diverse set of actors competing to supply 
information.  In policies without publics, bureaucrats and other experts are most likely to 
testify given they are the actors most likely to have the information necessary for policy 
making. 
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The following two sections will outline the information supply and information 
prioritization in energy.  First, the differences in specific issue areas within energy 
policy will be discussed, paying particular attention to the distinctions between policies 
with and without publics.  Second, the motivations of private sources of information—
businesses and interest groups—will be identified.  The second section, on the 
prioritization of information in energy, discusses the impact of committees’ goals on the 
information prioritization process. 
Private Sources of Information in Energy 
The previous chapter was solely focused on bureaucrats as information suppliers.  
This chapter, and the analysis presented herein, is interested in when private sources of 
information—businesses and interest groups—are likely to have an information 
advantage in specific energy policies.  Businesses and interest groups compete to supply 
information to Congress to define problems, structure policy debates, and, ultimately, 
influence the direction of policy making.  Businesses and interest groups, though, vary 
by their specific motivations, the policy areas in which they are most likely to be active, 
and the committees by which they are most likely to be prioritized.  
Interest groups and businesses want to influence public policy towards their 
policy preferences.  A very effective way to influence policy making for these groups is 
by supplying information by lobbying and testifying at congressional committee 
hearings (Kingdon 1984; Smith 1995; Nownes 2001).  In fact, committee hearings often 
reflect the information committee members gain privately via lobbyists, broadcasting 
that private information to the lager policy-making community (see Leyden 1995; 
Wright 1996; Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Gromley 1998).   
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The prominence of interest groups and businesses testifying in energy issue areas 
varies.  In those policy areas where there are economic, private risks linked to policy 
making, such as electricity, coal, and gas, businesses and interest groups (especially 
trade and professional associations) are most active in the competition to supply 
information.  Not only are businesses and interest groups more active, but they clearly 
have pertinent information on these policy areas given that they operate within these 
industries and are directly affected by policy changes.   
Table 12: Congressional Committee Hearings and Witnesses by Issues and Publics in 
Energy Policy, 1995-2010 
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 In those policy areas with public risks that are not directly linked to private, 
economic risks, businesses and professional and trade associations are least likely to be 
active in the information supply process, and, therefore, less likely to be invited to 
testify at congressional committee hearings.  Table 12 shows the specific issues within 
energy policy35 and those that are considered having policies with publics and those 
without publics.   
In the policy areas where these private sources of information, businesses and 
interest groups, are most likely to supply information they are more likely to be 
prioritized by congressional committees to testify.  Witnesses representing businesses 
testify in higher numbers at energy hearings on electricity, alternative and renewable 
energy, and natural gas and oil.  Interest groups testify in higher numbers at committee 
hearings on energy conservation, electricity, and alternative and renewable energy.  
These issue areas are all policy areas with active publics, supporting the idea that these 
groups are most active and, therefore, most likely to testify in these areas.   
The fewest number of businesses and interest groups testify at energy hearings 
on nuclear energy, research and development, general and “other” issue areas.  All of 
these issue areas are considered coded as policies without publics, with the exception of 
general energy policy.  Fewer numbers of private businesses and interest groups 
testifying at hearings on these policies without publics is expected given the lack of 
direct, economic risks.  Further, even though the general energy issue is considered as 
having a public, the hearings largely cover appropriations for the U.S. Department of 
Energy and related agencies.  Findings from Chapter Four, show that bureaucrats are 
                                                 
35 These specific issue areas are taken directly from the Policy Agendas Project’s content coding scheme.  
The major topic code for Energy policy is comprised of these nine subtopics.  See www.policyagendas.org 
for their full coding scheme.  
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much more likely to testify at appropriations hearings, leaving less room for other 
witness types.   
The supply of available information, how active interest groups and businesses 
are, is dependent on the issue area.  Businesses and interest groups want to influence 
policy making in favor of their preferences, but will only put forth the resources and 
effort to supply information when they are adequately motivated.  For businesses and 
interest groups, especially trade associations, professional associations, and unions, the 
main motivation for engaging in politics it to protect against private economic risks.  
These policy areas addressing private risks have active, diverse publics competing to 
provide information to Congress.  In short, businesses and interest groups are most 
likely to testify in the policy areas in which they are the most active and most likely to 
have pertinent information.   
Prioritization of Information in Energy 
Each congressional committee has an overarching goal—constituency service, 
making good public policy, or power within the chamber.  Committees prefer 
information that is most likely to facilitate their goals.  For instance, a constituency 
committee prioritizes sources of information that are most likely to help members serve 
their constituents.  In energy policy, constituent committees are likely to prioritize key 
clientele or important businesses within their communities.  Table 13 shows the specific 
filtering expectations for each committee type—who will receive the most attention 
from constituency, power, and policy committees.  The table also offers examples of the 
expected witness types.   
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Table 13: Prioritization Expectations by Committee Type in Energy, 1995-2010 
 
 Constituency committees prioritize information generated by businesses, interest 
groups, state and local governments, and individual constituents.  These four groups are 
most likely to represent the committees’ clientele and constituents.  Policy committees 
pay most attention to interest groups and members of Congress because these witness 
types are most likely to provide the information to reinforce previously held policy 
positions.  Power committees prioritize information generated by bureaucrats and 
members of Congress because these witnesses provide the most information on the inner 
workings of the federal government as well as reinforce the prestige and power of the 
committee members.    
Congressional committees choose witnesses to facilitate their goals of 
constituency service, making good public policy, or gaining power within the chamber.  
Interest groups are most likely to testify at constituency and policy committee hearings 
than at hearings held by power committees.  Businesses, though, are more likely to 
testify at constituency committee hearings than at hearings held by the other two 
committee types.  
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DATA AND FINDINGS 
Congressional policy making requires information on problem definitions, 
feasibility and cost of solutions, consequences of policy change for upcoming elections, 
among other things.  Who supplies this information to congressional committees has an 
influence on the problem definition and solution and, ultimately, the new policy. 
Understanding who supplies information within a given policy area is critical for 
understanding policy change within that issue. To determine who supplies information 
within energy policy a dataset of all hearings on that policy area and the witnesses 
testifying at each hearing was created.  
For each congressional committee hearing, all witnesses testifying were 
collected.  Then each witness was coded according to the institution he or she 
represented at the hearing.  See Table 14 for a list of witness codes for private 
witnesses36, businesses and interest groups, and the number of each type testifying at 
congressional committee hearings on Energy from 1995 to 2010.  Each witness was first 
coded into a broad category and, then, into a second, more specific subcategory.  For 
business witnesses, witnesses were coded as representing a large business if the 
affiliated company had one thousand or more employees and coded as a small business 
if the company had less than one thousand employees.  Interest groups were coded based 
on their purpose: trade associations, professional associations, unions, or general 
nonprofits37.  
  
                                                 
36 In the full dataset (see Table 7), there is the Other category that could also be defined as private 
witnesses.  The Other witness category includes individuals, Native Americans, and foreign countries.  
The total number of witnesses is not large enough (N=106) to include in this particular analysis.   
37 Nonprofit interest groups include all groups not representing an industry, professional group, or unions.  
These groups include citizen groups, activist groups, and think tanks.   
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Table 14: Private Witness Types Testifying at Energy Hearings, 1995-2010 
 
 This energy policy dataset consists of 826 hearings with a total of 1,287 interest 
groups and 1,622 businesses testifying from 1995 to 2010.  Of the subcategories of 
witnesses, big businesses are the most frequent testifiers in energy and unions38 are the 
least frequent with 853 and 35 witnesses, respectively.   
Each hearing was also coded for the type of committee: constituency, policy, or 
power, which held 504, 279, and 43 hearings on energy, respectively.  As with the 
previous dataset, each hearing was also coded for the presiding committee’s level of 
problem uncertainty.  Figure 5 in Chapter Four shows problem uncertainty by committee 
type in Energy policy.  Problem uncertainty39 in energy ranges from 0 to 0.89 with an 
average of 0.62.  The hearings were also coded for specific energy issue area, refer back 
                                                 
38 The infrequency of unions testifying in this policy area is possibly partially due to the fact that labor 
issues, regardless of industry, are coded under labor in the Policy Agendas Project’s content coding 
scheme. For more information, please see www.policyagendas.org. 
39 Refer back to Chapter Three for a discussion of how Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate 
problem uncertainty based off the different topic areas a given committee holds hearings on within a 
particular month.  
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to Table 12 for a list of these areas and the average number of private witnesses 
testifying at each.   
Additionally, hearing type, time, energy price and availability, party, chamber, 
and total number testifying were also controlled for. Referral and appropriations 
hearings account for 17 percent and 6 percent of all energy hearings respectively.  The 
energy price was measured as the domestic price of oil and ranges from 10.89 to 131.47 
dollars per barrel.  Energy availability was calculated as energy surplus or the total 
amount of energy produced less the total amount of energy consumed.  Energy surplus 
ranged from -3.41 to -1.23 quadrillion BTUs.  In terms of party and institution controls, 
Republican majorities, lame duck presidential status, unified government, and the House 
account for approximately 65 percent, 35 percent, 44 percent, and 62 percent, 
respectively. 
Findings 
Negative binomial models were used to estimate the number of bureaucrats and, 
later, interest groups testifying at congressional committee hearings on energy policy 
given committee type, specific issue are, and problem uncertainty.40  To refresh, based 
on the theory of pluralistic information processing, the work on policies and publics 
(May 1991), and this new approach to information prioritization, the following are the 
expectations findings: 
5: The subsystem actors that are capable of supplying information vary 
by specific policy area. 
                                                 
40 As explained in Chapter Four, a negative binomial model is appropriate for this data given that the 
dependent variable is a count of witnesses testifying at a given hearing.  Further, given the overdispersion 
of the data the negative binomial model is more appropriate than a simpler model like the Poisson count 
mode.   
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5a: Policies with publics have more diverse set of actors competing to 
supply information so committees are able to prioritize a wider range of 
actors. 
5b: Policies without publics have limited set of actors supplying 
information so committees are limited to the groups they can prioritize, 
usually bureaucrats or other technical experts.   
In short, businesses are expected to testify at higher numbers at hearings held by 
constituency committees; whereas, interest groups are expected to testify more 
frequently at constituency and policy committees.  Hearings on policies with publics—
general energy, electricity, gas and oil, coal, alternative and renewable energy, and 
energy conservation—are expected to have greater numbers of witnesses representing 
businesses and interest groups given these groups are most likely to be active in 
supplying information in these areas. 
Businesses 
The findings for the negative binomial model predicting the number of witnesses 
testifying at a given hearing in energy who are representing businesses are shown in 
Figure 11.  As with the previous plots, the dots are the coefficient estimates and the 
horizontal lines through those dots are the 95 percent confidence intervals.  If these 
confidence bands do not cross the vertical line at zero, the coefficients are statistically 
significant.  (The full results are presented in Table E2 in Appendix E.)  The baseline 
variables for congressional committee and energy topic are constituency committee and 
general energy issues, respectively. 
The two most important findings are that (1) there does not appear to be 
differences in how the three congressional committee types prioritize business witnesses 
and (2) there are differences in the number of businesses testifying at energy hearings by 
topic.  Constituency, policy, and power committees prioritize businesses as sources of 
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information at the same rates.   This finding is unexpected given that constituency 
committees, which prefer clientele groups as information sources, should prioritize 
businesses (clientele) more frequently than other committee types.  Committees as a 
whole, though, appear to prioritize businesses at different rates depending on the specific 
energy issue being discussed.  More witnesses representing businesses testify at hearings 
on electricity, gas and oil, coal, and alternative and renewable energy than other issue 
areas.  These issue areas are all policies with publics or issues that have private 
economic risks which act to motivate businesses to be active in the information supply 
process.  The more active businesses (or other subsystem actors) are in the information 
supply process, the more likely they will be prioritized as sources of information by 
Congress.  Businesses are also far less likely to testify at hearings on nuclear energy 
policy.  Nuclear energy is a policy without a public because the risks associated with 
policy are public.  Businesses are less likely to be active in the supply process given the 
public risks, but also less likely to have the information necessary for policy making.  
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is one of few institutions with the necessary 




Figure 11: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Businesses Testifying at 
Committee Hearings on Energy Policy 1995-2010 
Few of the control variables relate to the number of businesses testifying at 
congressional committee hearings on energy.  One exception is in hearing types.  
Witnesses representing businesses are less likely to testify at referral hearings 
(legislative hearings and much less likely to testify at appropriations hearings.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, appropriations hearings regard the funding of the 
federal bureaucracy and rely heavily on the testimony of federal bureaucrats.  On other 
interesting finding is that uncertainty is not related to the number of witnesses 
representing businesses.  This null finding further supports the idea that bureaucrats 
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have an information advantage, particularly when committees are faced with problem 
uncertainty.   
 
Figure 12: Predicted Probabilities for the Count of Businesses Testifying at 
Congressional Committee Hearings by Energy Topic, 1995-2010 
The negative binomial results are difficult to interpret directly.  Therefore, Figure 
12 shows the predicted probabilities for the count of businesses testifying at 
congressional committee hearings in energy policy from 1995-2010.  Businesses are 
predicted to account for 3.5 witnesses at a committee hearing on electricity policy.  To 
put this number in perspective, an average of seven witnesses testify at a given 
congressional committee so 3.5 business witnesses account for 50 percent of the average 
hearing panel.  Similarly at hearings on coal policy, almost 3 business witnesses are 
predicted to testify at committee hearings or roughly 43 percent of the witness panel.  In 
contrast, less than 1 witness representing a business is predicted to testify at a hearing on 
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nuclear energy policy.  In short, the hearings on policies with publics (general energy, 
electricity, gas and oil, coal, alternative and renewable energy, and energy conservation), 
for the most part, have more businesses testifying than at those hearings on policies 
without publics.   
Table 15: Business Witnesses by Industry Type in Energy Policy, 1995-2010   
 
 Businesses obviously face different private, economic risks.  In energy, these 
differences in economic risks are best illustrated by the differences between extraction 
and mining companies and companies manufacturing alternative sources of energy.  
Extraction and mining companies benefit from policies promoting a greater reliance on 
fossil fuels, while energy manufacturing companies benefit from the exact opposite.  To 
take a close look at which industries are being represented by the businesses testifying at 
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energy hearings during this time frame, business witnesses received an additional code 
based on the industry to which they belong.   
A simplified version of the North American Industry Classification System41 
(NAICS) codes were used to categorize the witnesses based on the companies they were 
representing.  Table 15 has a list of the industries that were represented by witnesses 
testifying in energy from 1995-2010. The industries receiving the most attention during 
this time include extraction (ex. drilling and mining), utilities (ex. electricity, gas, and 
water), and manufacturing (ex. solar, wind, and automobiles).  These industries were 
responsible for 291, 397, and 325 witnesses during this time frame, respectively.  These 
industries having being prioritized as information suppliers in energy is expected for two 
reasons.  First, these industries are motivated by private, economic risks to get involved 
in policy making to influence policy towards their specific preferences.  Second, the 
businesses’ expertise in these areas as well as the probability that many are valuable 
clientele of constituency-focused members of congress makes them important sources of 
information.   
The business witnesses were then collapsed into four categories: construction 
and manufacturing to account for alternative energy industries42, extraction and mining 
to account for fossil fuel industries, utilities to account for utility industries, and other 
which accounts for all other witness types.  A summary of these witnesses with 
                                                 
41 North American Industry Classification System is the standard coding scheme used by the US 
government to classify businesses in order to collect data related to the economy. (See the U.S. Census for 
more information on the full NAICS.)  For this project, the businesses were coded into the highest level of 
the codes.  For example, all manufacturing, regardless of their sub-classifications, were coded as 31 for 
manufacturing.  See Table 15 for a list of industry codes used here.    
42 Companies building salt stacks, windmills, solar panels, and other alternative sources of energy were 
coded as manufacturing.  Unfortunately this category of business witness also includes a small number of 
other manufacturing types, including automobile manufacturers.  Construction companies are responsible, 
at least in this dataset, for installing manufactured alternative sources of energy as well as alternative 
forms of heating and cooling.  As with manufacturing category, there are a few non-energy construction 
companies, such as home builders, but they are a small minority in this dataset.   
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examples of each is shown in Table 16.  Construction and manufacturing witnesses in 
this dataset are largely from energy companies focused on making energy (solar and 
wind).  This category also includes all other manufacturing and construction, including 
automobile manufacturers and home construction companies.  Extraction witnesses 
represent resource extraction companies—oil and gas extraction and coal mining.  
Utility witnesses are those from utility companies—mainly electric companies, but 
includes all utilities types.  All other industries are coded as other, including consulting 
and financial businesses.  Construction and manufacturing, extraction and mining, and 
utility companies make up approximately two-thirds of all business witnesses.   
Table 16: Business Witnesses by Type Testifying at Energy Hearings, 1995-2010 
 
 Over time, there has been a push in energy policy to move more toward 
conservation and alternative and renewable sources of energy and away from fossil 
fuels.  This push towards alternative sources of energy has been the result of increases in 
both gas prices and the desire for energy independence as well as a greater 
understanding of air pollution and climate change.  With this data, it is possible to see if 
alternative and renewable businesses testify in greater numbers over time.  Figure 13 
shows the count of witnesses in each business category at congressional committee 
hearings on energy by month from 1995-2010.  
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The dark black of construction and manufactured energy businesses seems to 
become more pronounced over time.  Specifically in the early to mid-2000s, 
construction and manufacturing business (a proxy for alternative and renewable energy 
businesses) become more prominent as witnesses testifying at congressional committees 
on energy policy.  The move to prioritize information from alternative and renewable 
energy businesses seems to occur around the same as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit the 
gulf coast in 2005, the U.S. was engaged in war in the Middle East, and gas prices went 
over $3.0043 for the first time in July of 2006.  The combination of the high prices of 
gasoline and instability in the oil production and refinement led policy makers to take 
greater interest in alternative sources of energy and therefore alternative sources of 
information.  The attention shift in energy policy appears to be reflected in the 
information prioritized at congressional committee hearings.  
  
                                                 





























































































 Witnesses representing businesses testify at higher rates at hearings on policies 
with publics that at hearings on policies without publics.  This finding is expected 
because businesses are more active as information suppliers when there are greater 
economic stakes attached as in policies with publics.  And, in these areas, they are most 
likely to have the capacity to supply useful information.  Unfortunately there is little 
evidence in differences in how committee types prioritize businesses as sources of 
information.  Also, when looking at specific industries, though, it does appear that 
alternative and renewable energy businesses have become more prevalent as sources of 
information over time.  An increase in these businesses as information suppliers is 
consistent with a shift in congressional attention to alternative and renewable energy 
policy.   
Interest Groups 
The same analysis done for businesses was repeated for interest groups testifying 
at congressional committee hearings.  The findings for the negative binomial model 
predicting interest groups testifying at congressional committee hearings is presented in 
Figure 14. (See Table E2 in Appendix E for full results).  The plot can be read the same 
way as the previous models, with the dots as coefficient estimates and the horizontal 
lines as the 95 percent confidence intervals.  The baseline variables for committee type 





Figure 14: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Interest Groups Testifying at 
Committee Hearings on Energy Policy 1995-2010 
As with the business witnesses, interest groups do not appear to be prioritized at 
different rates by the three congressional committee types.  However, there are some 
differences in the number of interest groups testifying across energy issues.  Interest 
groups are most likely to testify at hearings on alternative and renewable energy and 
energy conservation, both of which are policies with publics.  Interest groups are least 
likely to testify, though, at hearings on energy research and development, which is a 
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policy without a public.  These findings provide more support for differences in 
information supply between the two types of policies. 
Similar to the findings for businesses, interest groups testifying is not associated 
with the problem uncertainty, which reinforces the findings of Chapter Four.   Interest 
groups are less likely to testify at appropriations hearings, most likely because of the 
focus on the federal bureaucracy.  Interest groups, though, are more likely to testify at 
referral (or legislative) hearings on energy, which may be due to their ability to supply 
policy expertise and partisan cues (this is especially true for many citizen groups and 
think tanks).  Increased number of all witnesses invited to testify is also positively 
associated with the number of interest groups invited to testify.  As Congress invites 
more interest groups as they invite more witnesses overall. 
The last finding of note is that more interest groups testify at hearings held by the 
House than at those held by the Senate.  This may be due to the time, resource, and 
professionalization differences between the two chambers.  The interest groups may help 
alleviate the resource and expertise deficiency of the House due to less resources and a 
greater need to continually campaign for re-election.  
Again, negative binomial results are easiest to interpret when shown as predicted 
probabilities.  Figure 15 displays the predicted probabilities for the number of interest 
groups testifying at energy hearings from 1995-2010.  In general, interest groups do not 
testify frequently in energy policy, with less than two interest groups predicted to testify 
at a hearing on any given topic.  Approximately, 1.75 interest groups are predicted to 
testify at energy conservation hearings.  At hearings on energy research and 
development, only about one-quarter of an interest group is estimated to testify or about 
one interest group per four hearings on this topic.   
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Figure 15: Predicted Probabilities for the Count of Interest Groups Testifying at 
Congressional Committee Hearings by Energy Topic, 1995-2010 
The findings for interest groups provide some support for the new approach to 
information supply and prioritization.  In terms of supply, interest groups are most active 
in policies with publics and least active in policies without publics, as predicted.  
However, in terms of the ways in which interest groups would be prioritized at higher 
levels by constituency and policy committees, there was no support. 
Conclusions 
Subsystem actors readily supply information to Congress in hopes of influencing 
problem definitions and the policy-making process.  Congressional committees must 
sort through this oversupply of information, deciding what to attend to and what to 
ignore.  Committee hearings offer a convenient way for committees to prioritize the 
subsystem-generated information, choosing who testifies and who does not.  
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Committees, though, can only prioritize those sources of information that are available, 
which varies by policy area. 
This chapter investigated how committees filter private, subsystem-generated 
information based on their overarching priorities—constituency service, making public 
policy, or power and prestige—and the issue areas in energy.  Using a dataset of all 
congressional committee hearings on energy from 1995-2010, the findings presented 
herein show that committees do, in fact, filter information consistent with the policy 
characteristics of specific energy issues.  No evidence, though, supports the expectation 
of committees’ information preferences reelecting their overarching priorities. 
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter show that information tradeoffs are 
necessary from one policy area to another.  At electricity policy hearings, for example, 
are predicted to make up about half of the entire witness panel.  Information supplied at 
hearings can influence the policy-making activities of the committee.  Therefore, when a 
committee favors a certain witness type at the expense of others it can have a major 
impact on policy.   
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Chapter 6: Prioritizing Public Sources of Information in Energy Policy 
The examples from the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) 
showed that not only were businesses and interest groups sharing information with 
Congress to define the problem and steer debates, public actors, such as members of 
Congress and states and localities, were also very active in the information supply 
process.  Even though public and private actors differ in their motivations to share 
information with Congress, both actor types are interested in shaping problem 
definitions and ultimately the policy process to mirror their specific policy preferences.    
This chapter continues in the same vein as the previous one, looking at the 
supply and prioritization of information in energy policy.  Whereas the previous chapter 
investigated the prioritization of private witnesses—interest groups and businesses—this 
chapter focuses on public witnesses, specifically federal bureaucrats, states and 
localities, and, to a lesser extent, member of Congress.  The motivations of public 
officials—elected and unelected—differs from those of private witnesses.   
The following sections will overview the motivations of federal bureaucrats, 
states and localities, and members of Congress in the information supply process.  Later 
sections review how committees are expected to prioritize these witness types given 
committee goals and issue characteristics.  The final section will present the findings 
showing support for the new approach to information prioritization presented by this 
project.  
INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ENERGY POLICY 
There are three parts to information processing in any policy area: supply, 
prioritization, and application.  The process is characterized by subsystem actors 
competing to supply information to Congress in an effort to affect policy change.  
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Prioritization is the process by which congressional committees, the information 
processing arm of Congress, determine which sources of information to attend and 
which to ignore.  The application of information is actually taking what was learned 
from the information prioritization and choosing whether to apply it to the problem 
definition process.   
The following sections will discuss the motivations for public witnesses to 
supply information to Congress, when each witness type is more or less likely to be 
active in the supply process across the different issue areas in energy policy, and how 
congressional committees are expected to prioritize the information supplied.   
Public Sources of Information 
Public sources of information44: federal bureaucrats, state and local bureaucrats 
and elected officials, and members of Congress, differ in their motivations for supplying 
information in the policy making process.  The generation of information for greater 
knowledge is a goal for federal bureaucracies and state and local bureaucrats.  These 
actors generate information without necessarily having a specific policy preference as 
we would expect from businesses and interest groups.  On the other hand, these actors 
have constituency groups they are representing to Congress.  While these actors might 
not be motivated by market principles like businesses, they are motivated to better their 
constituents via preferred problem definitions and extended budgets.  This section 
reviews the motivations of public sources of information in the information supply 
process and the expectations for their level of activity across issue areas. 
                                                 
44 Public institutions, hospitals and universities, would also be included in this category.  In this particular 
policy area, though, only 258 witnesses represented public institutions during this 16 year time frame.  In 
health care, for example, these institutions play a much more active role in supplying information to 
Congress.   
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Federal bureaucrats are motivated to supply information to Congress for a 
variety of reasons.  For many bureaucratic agencies, such as the Energy Information 
Administration, they were created solely for the purpose of generating policy 
information for policy makers.  Bureaucrats are also frequently compelled to testify at 
congressional oversight hearings.  Beyond their legal obligations to supply information, 
bureaucrats are often eager to offer information to Congress for two self-interested 
reasons: expanding their budgets and ensuring their jurisdictions (see Dery 1984; King 
1997; and May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2009).  Bureaucrats are not always trying to 
expand their jurisdictions as May and colleagues (2009) point out, they often are trying 
to protect the status quo.   
State and local governments often supply information to Congress to garner 
monetary support for state and local projects (see Pelissero and England 1987).  The 
federalist system in the U.S. means that lower levels of government depend on grants, 
subsidies, and other types of federal funding.  Therefore, bureaucrats and elected 
officials from states and localities as well as broad sub-national government associations 
(ex. National Conference of State Legislators) are motivated to supply information to 
Congress in hopes of expanding their budgets via federal funding.  In the earlier Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 example, localities were supplying information 
to Congress in hopes of redefining energy independence as independence from fossil 
fuels.  Their end goal was to secure federal subsidies for producing alternative forms of 
electricity.  These subsidies would have provided a large amount of funding to states and 
local governments to potentially create new jobs and lower both energy costs and 
pollution.  States and localities, especially bureaucratic agencies from these 
governments, are also motivated to share information to Congress about innovated 
policies from their states (see Boushey 2010 for a discussion of policy diffusion).   
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Congressional hearings offer committee members not only the opportunity to 
gain information from subsystem actors, but also from fellow members of Congress.  In 
fact, many members of Congress frequently testify at committee hearings to broadcast 
information to the chamber and the greater policy community as well as take stances for 
their constituents (see Diermeier and Fedderson 2000).  Hearings allow members to 
broadcast their information to the broader policy community and their constituents given 
the extensive coverage of hearings on C-SPAN and other media outlets.   
The analysis in this chapter focuses on federal bureaucrats and states and 
localities testifying at hearings on energy.  Unfortunately, the number of hearings with 
witnesses representing members of Congress is too low for the model to estimate.  
Though, there is some anecdotal evidence that members of Congress come out in large 
numbers to testify when the stakes are high.  Specifically, there were two hearings on 
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 199645 that had a total of 133 
and 168 witnesses testifying.   Close to 30 percent of these 301 witnesses at two 
hearings were members of Congress.  It seems that most of these members were 
testifying in hopes of increasing the federal funding for energy and water development 
projects in their districts.  For example, Representative Jim McCrery (R-LA) testified 
before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development in March 1995 (Energy and Water Development Appropriations 1995).  
He was testifying in support of multiple projects in the Red River Valley.   
The supply of information is determined by the individual motivations of 
subsystem actors and the characteristics of the policy area.  Each subsystem player has 
different motivations for supplying information to Congress. Businesses, for example, 
                                                 
45 Two hearings on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1996 CIS 95-H181-48 (133 
witnesses) and 95-H181-49 (168 witnesses).   
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often are motivated to supply information to Congress for economic reasons.  
Alternatively, some bureaucracies were created for the sole purpose of generating policy 
information.   How motivated an actor is to supply information is partially determined 
by the policy area.  As May (1991) points out, some policy areas are associated with 
private economic risks, ensuring that private companies and their associates are going to 
be highly motivated to supply information that favors their policy preferences.  Some 
policy areas, though, are associated with public risks that do not directly affect private 
subsystem actors.  In these areas, such as energy research and development, bureaucrats 
are going to be the most active information supplier.   
Those issues with publics, such as electricity and gas and oil, are more likely to 
address private economic risks (see May 1991).  Fear of private economic risks motivate 
businesses and related actors to become more active in the information supply process.  
They hope that by sharing information they are able to shift policy in their favors and 
minimize their individual risks.  For public witnesses, such as members of Congress and 
states and localities, they are also motivated to supply information on behalf of their 
clientele or constituents in these areas in hopes of lowering the risks for the key 
companies in their districts.  In the EISA 2007 example, Representative Dingell (D-MI) 
was active in his support of General Motors.  He hoped to lower the risks associated 
with increased CAFE standards for a key clientele company.  
Many states and localities also supply information in these areas in hopes of 
expanding their budgets and their ability to supply these energy resources to 
constituents.  Again, during the debates on EISA 2007, states and localities shared 
information with Congress in hopes of increasing the federal funding in their areas for 
alternative and renewable innovations in electricity production.   
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In policies without publics, though, federal bureaucrats are most likely to be 
active in the information supply process.  These policy areas are associated with public 
risks rather than private risks (May 1991).  It is assumed that the public will absorb the 
costs of public risks and, therefore, most witness types are unlikely to be motivated to 
supply information.  The exception is bureaucrats who are legally bound to engage in 
policy surveillance, collect, and generate information in these policy areas.  These 
bureaucrats are, then, more likely to be active, and therefore testify more frequently, in 
polices without publics than the other witness types.   
Table 17: Congressional Committee Hearings and Witnesses by Issues and Publics in 
Energy Policy, 1995-2010 
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 Table 17 shows the congressional committee hearings and witnesses by issues46 
and publics in energy policy.  Hearings on natural gas and oil account for one quarter of 
the hearings in energy during this time frame.  Hearings on general energy issues, 
electricity and hydroelectricity, and alternative and renewable fuels account for a little 
more than 100 hearings each.   
Committee hearings on issues of nuclear energy, general energy, research and 
development, and “other” have the highest averages of bureaucrats testifying.   These 
issue areas are, for the most part, those considered to not be associated with active 
publics. The highest average of states and localities testifying is at hearings on electricity 
and hydroelectricity, a policy associated with a very active public.  Members of 
Congress testify at much lower rates than other witness types, but most frequently 
appear at hearings on electricity and hydroelectricity and energy conservation (both of 
which are policies with publics).  Overall, bureaucrats testify most frequently at hearings 
on policies without publics; whereas, states and localities and members of Congress 
testify most frequently at hearings on policies with publics.   
Prioritization of Information in Energy 
The prioritization process is based on the goals of the congressional committees.  
Members of Congress self-select onto committees based on their top goal: constituency 
service, making good public policy, or gaining power and prestige within the chamber.  
Each committee, then, has one overarching goal in common.  Members of constituency 
committees, such as House Agriculture or Senate Armed Services, all share a common 
goal of constituency service.  Policy committees, such as House Commerce or Senate 
Health, have a commonly shared goal of making good public policy.   House Ways and 
                                                 
46 These hearings are coded according to the Policy Agendas Project’s content coding scheme. See the 
Policy Agendas Project for full detail on their content coding scheme (www.policyagendas.org). 
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Means and the Senate Budget Committees are examples of power committees, in which 
committees share a common goal of gaining more power or prestige within the chamber. 
These shared goals do not mean that the individual members agree on problems 
or solutions.  It does imply, though, that the shared goals will lead to shared preferences 
for information sources.   Constituency committees, for instance, prefer information 
from constituency and clientele groups.  Members from the Republican Party may prefer 
different individual actors than those from the Democratic Party, but members from both 
parties prefer the same type of information source: constituent and clientele groups.  The 
same is true for the other two committee types.  Policy committees prefer information 
from policy coalitions, such as interest groups and fellow members of Congress.  Power 
committees prefer information from elite sources, such as fellow members of Congress 
and presidentially appointed bureaucrats.  In short, congressional committees prioritize 
information that will facilitate the achievement of their shared goals.   
DATA AND FINDINGS 
Public sources of information have different motivations for sharing information 
in energy policy than businesses and interest groups.  Keeping with the previous 
analyses, the data used here is all congressional committee hearings in energy policy 
from 1995-2010.  The witnesses for each of 826 energy hearings were then collected. 
Each of the 5,758 witnesses were then coded according to the institution he or she 
represented when testifying. 
Table 18 shows the number of public witnesses testifying (federal bureaucrats, 
members of Congress, and states and localities) in energy policy.  Each public witness 
below was first assigned to the broad category of government and then to a second, more 
specific subcategory.  Federal bureaucrats make up over one half of all public witnesses, 
 134 
with 1,578 testifying during this time.  Members of Congress testified at committee 
hearings on energy 305 times, while states and localities testified about twice that 
number. 
Table 18: Public Witness Types Testifying at Energy Hearings, 1995-2010 
 
 Each hearing was also coded for the goal of the presiding committee 
(constituency service, making public policy, or gaining power within the chamber).  
Constituency, policy, and power committees were responsible for holding 504, 279, and 
43 hearings, respectively.  As with previous analyses, every hearing was additionally 
coded for the presiding committees’ level of problem uncertainty47, hearing type48, 
time49, energy price and availability50, party51, chamber52, unified government53, lame 
                                                 
47 See Figure 5 in Chapter Four for the average level of problem uncertainty by month for each committee 
type in energy from 1995-2010. 
48 There are controls for two types of hearings: referral and appropriations which account for 17 percent 
and 6 percent of hearings, respectively.  
49 Time is just a simple count for months.   
50 Energy price is calculated as the price of domestic oil in the use, ranging from $10.81 to $131.47 
dollars per barrel.  Energy availability also called energy surplus is calculated as the difference between 
the total energy produced and the total energy consumed in the U.S.  Energy surplus ranges from -3.41 to -
1.23 quadrillion BTUs.  
51 Republican majorities in Congress account for about 65 percent of all hearings in energy during this 
time frame.   
52 Approximately 62 percent of the hearings in energy during this time were held in the House.  
53 About 44 percent of the hearings on energy came during times of unified government. 
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duck status of the president54, and total number of witnesses testifying55.  Finally, 
hearings coded for specific energy issue area.  (Refer back to Table 17 for a list of topics 
and the number of witnesses testifying in each area.)  
Findings 
As with the previous two chapters, negative binomial models were used to 
estimate the impact of committee goals, issue characteristics, and uncertainty on the 
number of each bureaucrats and states and localities.  Negative binomial models, rather 
than Poisson models, are appropriate here given the dependent variable is a count model 
and the data is overdispersed.   
As with Chapter Five, the expectations for the findings are based on the theory of 
pluralistic information processing, the work on policies and publics (May 1991), and this 
new approach to information prioritization.  They are as follows: 
 
5: The subsystem actors that are capable of supplying information vary 
by specific policy area. 
5a: Policies with publics have more diverse set of actors competing to 
supply information so committees are able to prioritize a wider range of 
actors. 
5b: Policies without publics have limited set of actors supplying 
information so committees are limited to the groups they can prioritize, 
usually bureaucrats or other technical experts.   
Policies with publics have diverse sets of highly competitive subsystem actors 
engaged in providing information to Congress.  Given the abundance of information 
suppliers, Congress have less need to rely heavily on information from federal 
                                                 
54 Only about 35 percent of energy hearings during this time occurred during the final two years of a 
president’s second term.   
55 The total number of witnesses testifying is actually the total number testifying less the number of 
witnesses of interest.  For example, the negative binomial model for bureaucratic witnesses would include 
a variable for other witness types calculated as all witnesses at the hearing less bureaucrats (or the 
dependent variable).   
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bureaucrats.  In policies without politics, subsystem actors are less motivated to supply 
information leaving bureaucrats as one of a few capable sources of information.  In these 
areas, Congress must rely more heavily on federal bureaucrats for information.   
The findings from Chapter Five show supporting evidence for the private 
subsystem actors being more active in the information supply process in policies with 
publics and less active in policies without publics.  The following analyses should show 
states and localities being prioritized in a similar way to private witnesses.  Federal 
bureaucrats, though, should be more active, and therefore testify more frequently, in 
policies without publics.   
Bureaucrats 
The findings from the negative binomial model, which estimates the number of 
bureaucrats testifying at a given congressional committee hearing on energy policy are 
displayed in Figure 16.  As with previous rope ladder plots, the dots are the coefficient 
estimates and the horizontal lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals.  If the 
confidence intervals do not cross the horizontal line at zero, the coefficient is statistically 
significant.  (See Table E3 in Appendix E for the full table of findings.) 
First, the findings suggest that bureaucrats are less likely to testify at hearings on 
those policies that have active publics, such as natural gas and oil, alternative and 
renewable energy, and energy conservation policy.  Bureaucrats are less likely to testify 
in these areas because they are one of many subsystem actors competing to supply 
information in these policy areas.  On the other hand, bureaucrats are most likely to 
testify at committee hearings on policies without publics, like research and development.  
In policy areas without publics, Congress tends to rely more heavily on federal 




Figure 16: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Bureaucrats Testifying at 
Committee Hearings on Energy Policy 1995-2010 
Another really important finding in this model is that it reinforces the findings 
from Chapter Four.  Congressional committees call higher numbers of bureaucrats to 
testify at hearings as problem uncertainty increases.  Bureaucrats are the only witness 
type that is associated with problem uncertainty.  This is a clear indication that 
bureaucrats have an information advantage when members of Congress are unclear 
about the problem definition or which attribute of the problem is the most important.  
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Further, the model again shows that bureaucrats are much more likely to testify 
at appropriations hearings.  All other witness types tested (businesses, interest groups, 
and state and local governments) testify less frequently at appropriations hearings.  
Appropriations hearings deal primarily with funding the federal bureaucracy which 
requires information from those with the most information about the 
bureaucracy…federal bureaucrats.  On the other hand, bureaucrats are less likely to 
testify at referral hearings than other hearing types.    
What the findings do not show, however, is additional support for differences in 
information preferences across committee types.  It is unclear why there appeared to be 
differences in committee preferences for bureaucrats testifying in the full model in 
Chapter Four that included all three major policy areas and not in this model on energy 
policy hearings alone.  One important note is that power committees invite more 
witnesses to testify with a statistical significance at 0.1. There are only 43 power 
committee hearings held in energy which may explain the discrepancy in the two 
models. 
The coefficients from negative binomial models cannot be directly interpreted.  
Therefore, predicted probabilities for the number of bureaucrats testifying at each energy 
issue area were calculated.  These predicted probabilities are displayed in Figure 17.   
Bureaucrats are most likely to testify at the policies without publics: nuclear 
energy, research and development, and “other” energy issues, which are all associated 
with public risks.  Since these policy areas are not associated with private economic 
risks, private businesses and interest groups are less likely to be active in the information 
supply process (see May 1991).  With less information available, Congress will rely 
more heavily on the information available from other sources, specifically federal 
bureaucrats.   
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Figure 17: Predicted Probabilities for the Count of Bureaucrats Testifying at 
Congressional Committee Hearings by Energy Topic, 1995-2010 
In nuclear energy policy, for example, about 2.5 bureaucrats are predicted to 
testify at a congressional committee hearing as compared to less than one interest group 
or business.  In research and development policy, almost 3 bureaucrats are predicted to 
testify, which is more than both the predicted number of businesses and interest groups 
combined.  In those policy areas with publics, though, that are associated with private 
economic risks, bureaucrat are less likely to testify.  In gas and oil policy, only about 
1.75 bureaucrats are predicted to testify at a given hearing; whereas, businesses and 
interest groups account for approximately 3.5 witnesses combined or about 50 percent of 
the total panel.  It appears that bureaucrats have an important role in supplying 
information at congressional hearings across issue areas in energy policy.  However, in 
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those policy areas where few other actors compete to supply information, bureaucrats 
are even more likely to be prioritized by congressional committees. 
I recoded the bureaucratic witnesses based on the agencies they represent into 
one of four categories—defense; energy; land, environment, and agriculture; and other.   
Bureaucrats representing defense, national security, international relations, and related 
agencies were coded as defense.  Those bureaucrats representing energy agencies, such 
as the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, were coded as 
energy.  Those agencies most likely to deal with issues of conservation, the 
environment, and agriculture were coded as land.  All other bureaucrats were coded as 
other.   
Table 19: Bureaucratic Witness Types Testifying at Energy Hearings, 1995-2010 
 
 Table 19 lists examples of agencies for each bureaucratic witness type and the 
number of each testifying in energy policy from 1995-2010.  By far, bureaucrats from 
energy-related bureaucracies provided the majority of bureaucratic information during 
this time.  In fact, energy-related bureaucracies testify almost four times more frequently 
than any other bureaucratic witness type and make up approximately sixty percent of all 
bureaucrats testifying.   
Each bureaucracy looks at a problem from a different angle or expertise and each 
has the goals of expanding or protecting their budgets and jurisdictions (see King 1997 
 141 
and Dery 1984). These four different types of bureaucracies represent four distinct sets 
of policy expertise.  The problem definitions generated from information supplied by the 
Department of Defense, then, should differ greatly from those definitions resulting from 
information supplied by the Department of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture.   
Figure 18 shows the number of bureaucrats testifying each month from 1995-
2010 for each of the four bureaucratic witness types: defense, energy, land and 
environment, and other.  It is clear that during the entire time period, bureaucrats from 
energy-related agencies make up the majority of bureaucratic witnesses.  Interestingly 
though, starting around 2004 bureaucrats from defense-related agencies become more 
prevalent at hearings on energy policy.  Most likely this increase in defense bureaucrats 
testifying is the result of a greater focus by Congress and the president defining the 
energy problem as one of energy independence and security.  In fact, much of the 
legislation during the mid-2000s was focused on just that, including the Energy 






























































































For the most part, the findings presented here on bureaucrats testifying at 
congressional committee hearings in energy policy provide additional support for those 
presented in Chapter Four.  Bureaucrats are the only witness types that are more likely to 
testify when the problem uncertainty of committees increases.  No other witness type is 
related to problem uncertainty in any way.  Bureaucrats are more likely to testify at 
appropriations hearings while all other witness types are less likely to testify at this type 
of hearing.  The one exception is that there did not appear to be difference in how the 
different committee types (constituency, policy, and power) prioritize bureaucratic 
witnesses.   
In terms of the policy areas with publics, bureaucrats are, for the most part, less 
likely to testify.   In polices with publics, many different subsystem actors are motivated 
by private risks to compete to supply information to Congress.  In those issues without 
publics, though, bureaucrats are overall much more likely to testify.  Bureaucrats are one 
of few subsystem actors capable of supplying information in these policies that 
associated with public risks.  When comparing bureaucrats to private witnesses, the 
differences between the witness types is even more compelling evidence in support of 
the claim that policy characteristics partially determine how active different witness 
types are in the information supply process and, therefore, how frequently they testify.  
State and Local Governments 
States and localities frequently rely on subsidies and grants from the federal 
government for a variety of projects, from building roads to innovative energy ventures.  
Unlike federal bureaucrats, these state and local bureaucrats and elected officials will act 
more like private witnesses in the information supply process.  The policies at the 
federal level of government directly impact what the policies the states and localities are 
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able to implement, both in terms of legality and funding.  States and localities are not 
only supplying information to protect their own policy preferences, but frequently they 
are supplying information to protect the preferences of important constituencies or 
clientele.  As a result, state and local governments are going to be more active, and, 
therefore, more likely to testify at hearings on policies with publics.  Policies with 
publics are, again, those policies associated with private economic risks (see May 1991). 
Once again, a negative binomial model was used to estimate the number of 
witnesses representing state and local governments at hearings on energy policy from 
1995-2010.  Below, the results are displayed in a rope ladder plot in Figure 19.  The dots 
are coefficient estimates; whereas, the horizontal lines are the 95 percent confidence 
intervals.  If the confidence intervals cross the vertical line at zero, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant.  (See Table E3 in Appendix E for the full list of findings.) 
States and localities are most likely to testify at congressional hearings on 
electricity, gas and oil, and coal policies.  These issue areas are all policies with publics 
that are associated with private risks.  Key clientele of state and local governments as 
well as localities themselves are often responsible for the supply and production of 
electricity.  States and localities are interested in promoting their (as well as their 
constituents’) policy preferences.  To ensure their policy preferences are known these 
governments must be active in the supply process.    In policy areas where states and 
localities do not have a strong stake in the policy outcomes, such as research and 




Figure 19: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of State and Local Governments 
Testifying at Committee Hearings on Energy Policy 1995-2010 
Other findings suggest that as Congress invites more witnesses in general, they 
invite more states and localities to testify.  In addition, at referral hearings states and 
localities are more likely to be invited to testify; whereas, they are less likely to testify at 
appropriations hearings.  Referral hearings are legislative in nature and often deal with 
understanding policy consequences, many of which can and will directly affect states 
and localities.  Appropriations hearings, on the other hand, deal with funding the federal 
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bureaucracy and it is unlikely states or localities will have the information necessary 
here.   
Again, the results from the negative binomial model are difficult to interpret 
directly.  Therefore, Figure 20 presents the predicted number of states and localities 
invited to testify at congressional committee hearings on energy from 1995 to 2010 by 
specific issue area.   
Witnesses representing state and local governments are most likely to testify at 
hearings on electricity, gas and oil, and coal policies.  States and localities account for 
almost 1.5 witnesses or about 20 percent of a hearing panel on electricity policy.  In both 
coal and gas and oil issue areas, almost 1 witness or about 14 percent of the panel at a 
committee hearing represents states and localities.  These issue areas are all considered 
policies with publics or policies associated with private risks.   These risks may be either 
risks to the states and localities (ex. electricity policy for locality-run utility company) or 
their clientele.  Either way, states and localities are motivated to supply information in 




Figure 20: Predicted Probabilities for the Count of State and Local Governments 
Testifying at Congressional Committee Hearings by Energy Topic, 1995-
2010 
In nuclear energy, research and development, and “other” energy policies, states 
and localities are much less likely to testify.  These issues are all considered policies 
without publics, associated with public risks.  The risk in these areas is most likely to be 
absorbed by the federal government and does little to motivate states and localities to 
supply information.  In these areas, federal bureaucrats are most likely to have the 
information Congress needs to make policy and therefore they rely little on other 
witness types.  In each of these policy areas, states and localities are estimated to testify 
at a rate of 0.25-0.50 witnesses per committee hearing or about 4 to 7 percent of the 
average witness panel.   
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Conclusions 
In conjunction with the findings presented in Chapter Five, the findings 
presented here show that policy characteristics, at least, partially determine which 
sources of information are invited to testify at congressional committee hearings on 
energy policy.  As predicted, in policy areas with publics businesses, interest groups, 
and states and localities are more likely to be invited to testify.  These policies are 
associated with private economic risks (see May 1991).  These risks motivate this wide 
range of actors to compete to supply information to Congress.  The diversity of 
information available to Congress in these areas allows them to prioritize a wider range 
of actors to testify rather than relying on one type of witness or another.    
In policies without publics, though, bureaucrats are more likely to testify.  
Because these policy areas are associated with public risks, there is less motivation for 
many of the witness types to be actively involved in the information supply process, 
bureaucrats being the exception.  Bureaucrats are often legally obligated to engage in 
policy surveillance and information generation in these policy areas giving Congress at 
least one information source it can rely on.  As a result in policy areas without publics, 
bureaucrats are one of a few sources of information available to Congress and, therefore, 
prioritized to testify more frequently.    
In addition, the findings presented in here and in Chapter Five, provide mixed 
support for Chapter Four findings.  In all six models presented in this project, 
bureaucrats were the only witness type to be associated with problem uncertainty.  
Consistently in the three models that estimated bureaucrats testifying at congressional 
committee hearings, bureaucrats were statistically and positively associated with an 
increase in problem uncertainty.  As congressional committees become more uncertain 
about the problem, regardless of the policy area, bureaucrats testify in greater numbers.  
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On the other hand, while Chapter Four showed that committees differ in their 
information preferences and how they prioritize information, neither Chapter Five or Six 
showed any evidence of this.  It may be because the number of different committee 
types was lower in the later models or the differences in committees’ information 
preferences could be driven by policy differences.  Overall, the findings suggest that 
bureaucrats have an information advantage in times of uncertainty, regardless of policy 
area, as well as in issues without publics.  To a much lesser degree, businesses, interest 
groups, and states and localities have an information advantage in those policies with 
publics.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Directions for Information 
Processing in Policy Subsystems 
According to the pluralistic theory of information processing, subsystem actors 
compete to supply information to Congress. By supplying information, subsystem actors 
have the opportunity to influence problem definitions, steer policy debates, and, 
ultimately, influence the policy making process.  The potential payoff from supplying 
information to Congress encourages the competition between the subsystem actors.  The 
result is that Congress is faced with an oversupply of information, which requires 
congressional committees to prioritize sources of information, choosing which to attend 
and which to ignore.   
This dissertation introduced a new approach to studying the prioritization of 
subsystem-generated information by congressional committees that focuses on the goals 
of the committees, policy area characteristics, and problem uncertainty.  The information 
prioritization process is important for understanding which subsystem actors (ex. 
bureaucrats, businesses, and interest groups) get to help define problem definitions and 
shape public policy.  This project is a first step in really understanding the information 
prioritization process in terms of the uncertainty committees have over a given policy 
problem, the varying characteristics of issue areas, and the information preferences of 
congressional committees.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings presented here show how bureaucrats are prioritized by 
congressional committee hearings to testify is influenced by policy area, committee 
type, and the presence of problem uncertainty.  In energy specifically, the number of 
public and private witnesses testifying at committee hearings varies by issue area, with 
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the number of bureaucrats also varying depending on the committee’s level of problem 
uncertainty.  
Bureaucrats and Uncertainty 
The number of bureaucrats testifying at congressional committee hearings is 
partially dependent on the committee’s level of problem uncertainty.  As problem 
uncertainty increases so, too, does the number of bureaucrats invited to testify at a 
hearing.  Committees tend to prefer bureaucrats to other sources in times of uncertainty 
because of the special relationship between the two institutions.  Many bureaucracies 
were created by Congress solely for policy surveillance and information generation.  
Additionally, bureaucrats and congressional committees work together repeatedly, at 
various stages of the policy process.  Committees, then, have a good idea of any bias the 
bureaucrats may have and can adjust accordingly. Bureaucrats also have long shelf lives 
to act as a long-term, stable source of information for Committees.    
The effect of problem uncertainty on increasing the number of bureaucrats 
testifying at congressional committees is especially true for careerist bureaucrats.  
Careerist bureaucrats differ from presidentially appointed bureaucrats in two important 
ways.  First, presidentially appointed bureaucrats may or may not be policy experts, as 
evidenced by Michael D. Brown as the director of FEMA during the Hurricane Katrina 
Crisis.  Careerist bureaucrats, though, are hired based on merit and frequently are highly 
trained professionals at the top of their respective fields.  Second, careerist bureaucrats 
are seen as apolitical; whereas, appointed bureaucrats are viewed as partisan extensions 
of the president.  These characteristics give careerists an even greater information 
advantage in sharing information with Congress as they are seen as technical and 
scientific experts.  
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Other evidence of congressional committees relying more heavily on bureaucrats 
for information is that the House of Representatives invites more bureaucrats, especially 
careerists, to testify than the Senate.  Members of the House are up for reelection every 
two years meaning they have less time to invest in becoming policy experts.  The 
chamber, as a whole, also has less resources than the Senate.  This finding suggests the 
House committees turn to bureaucrats to help alleviate their lack of time and resources 
and provide them with the policy information that they need.   
Committees 
Committees share a common goal—constituency service, making good public 
policy, or power within the chamber (Fenno 1973).  Committees prefer information that 
can facilitate their goals.  Constituency committees, for example, prefer information 
from citizens and clientele groups to help them best serve their constituents.  This 
project found mixed support for common committee preferences.  Chapter Four findings 
on committees across policy areas suggests that committee types adapt their information 
preferences across policy areas.  In energy policy, for example, power committee invite 
more bureaucrats; whereas, policy committees invite fewer bureaucrats.  Unfortunately, 
these findings do not hold up in Chapters Five and Six.   
The lack of findings supporting the differences in committees’ information 
preferences in the last two chapters could be for one of two reasons.  A much lower 
sample size in these models, especially for policy committees could be driving the null 
findings.  Another reason could be that the differences in committee preferences is 
driven by the differences in the three policy areas of domestic commerce, energy, and 
health care.  Extending the detailed analysis of energy to the other two policy areas 
could help resolve this problem. 
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Policy Areas 
Policies differ from one another in a number of ways, including the venue in 
which policy change occurs, the preferences driving policy change (ex. constituency, 
regional, or ideological preferences), and whether or not the issue has publics.  Because 
issue areas differ in these ways, the information necessary, preferred, and available 
varies as a result.  The findings presented here suggest that the information prioritized 
by committees does, indeed, differ by policy area.   
Bureaucrats, for example are much more likely to testify in health and energy 
policy than in domestic commerce policy.  Within energy, there are even clearer 
differences between those policies with publics and those without publics.  In policy 
areas with publics, a diverse and very active range of subsystem actors, motivated by 
fear of private, economic risks, compete to supply information to Congress.  These areas 
in energy (ex. electricity, natural gas and oil, coal) have more businesses, states and 
localities, and interest groups testifying at congressional hearings.  Bureaucrats, for the 
most part, are less likely to testify in these areas than in those without publics.  Policies 
without publics are associated with public risks and are less likely to motivate a diverse 
set of groups to supply information.  For the most part, technical and scientific experts 
are the most active in the information supply process in these areas.  In fact, bureaucrats 
are more likely to testify in these areas; whereas, businesses, interest groups, and states 
and localities are less likely to testify here.   
Overall, the findings presented here provide support for the new approach to 
information prioritization presented above.  Problem uncertainty, committee goals, and 
policy characteristics all seem to influence how congressional committee prioritize 
information, deciding who will testify and who will not.  Testimony is important 
because it not only shows an actor has gained access to Congress, but also broadcasts the 
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message to the larger policy community.  Further, by supplying information to 
Congress, a subsystem actor is given the opportunity to influence problem definitions, 
which can help steer policy debates and affect policy change.  Understanding who 
supplies information to Congress and when is necessary for understanding how problem 
definitions are formed and policies changed.   
NEW DIRECTIONS 
The research presented here suggests three new directions of study: information 
search strategies, the impact of prioritized information (testimony) on policy making, 
and information processing at the individual level.  Previous discussions suggest there 
are two information gathering strategies: narrow, expert search and broad information 
prioritization.  When do congressional committees engage in one search strategy rather 
than the other?  Second, Chapter Two identifies three parts of information processing: 
supply, prioritization, and application.  That is, how is prioritized information applied to 
the policy process? Does the prioritized information (hearing testimonies) help shape 
legislation?  Third extension of this project is individual information processing.  This 
study is restricted to institutional information processing.  Looking at the questions of 
individual members of Congress at congressional committee hearings will provide a 
clearer picture of how individuals search for information.   
Information Search Strategies 
The literature on the pluralistic and classic economic theories of information 
processing combined with Simon and Newell’s (1972) work on problems and solutions 
suggests that policy makers must adapt to their issue environment when searching for 
information.  Chapter Two argues that the pluralistic theory of information accurately 
describes the oversupply of information in the problem space, while classic economic 
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theory better describes the limited and costly nature of information in the solution space.  
These theories not only suggest that information is generated and supplied differently in 
these two contexts, but also that congressional information gathering strategies differ as 
a result.  Work by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) suggests that Congress engages in a 
narrow and focused expert search in the solution space because issues are so well-
defined and information is limited.  They go on to suggest, when issues are messy and 
multidimensional as in the problem space, Congress engages in entropic search what is 
referred to as information prioritization in this dissertation.  Information prioritization 
requires Congress to filter through the oversupply of subsystem generated information 
and decide what to attend.  
While these two strategies operate in two different contexts, no policy will 
permanently reside in either the problem or solution space.  Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) punctuated equilibrium theory of public policy suggests shocks or crises as well 
as new information can lead to policies requiring redefinition.  Nuclear energy policy, 
for example, had to be redefined after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991).  The advocacy coalition framework also suggests that 
players within a policy coalition can learn from one another, leading to new definitions 
of policy problems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).   
As well-defined problems break down, policymakers must adjust their 
information gathering strategies from one of narrow, expert search to broad information 
prioritization.  When issues are messy and undefined, particularly after a crisis, 
Congress reacts by gathering information by prioritizing information from a broad range 
of suppliers.  Actors trying to define the problem to mirror their preferences compete to 
supply information to Congress.  Information prioritization strategy allows Congress to 
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gather a wide range of information to help lower uncertainty surrounding the multiple 
dimensions of a problem.   
As the dimensionality of the policy area increases, committees move away from 
expert search to broad information prioritization.  The composition of witnesses 
testifying when problems are well-defined is limited to a narrow set of witness types.  
As the dimensionality of the problem increases, the witness composition broadens to 
include a greater variety of witness types to inform the importance of multiple attributes.  
As the problem becomes clearer and the dimensions of the problem decrease, the 
witness types testifying become more narrowly focused. How committees gather 
information reflects the nature of the policy area.  To test this an entropy or HHI 
measure can be used to calculate how concentrated (narrow) or broad the hearings 
panels are based on witness types.  Concentrated or narrow hearing panels suggest 
expert search; whereas, broad, diverse panels suggest information prioritization.   
Testimony Impact on Policy Making 
The analyses presented here are focus mainly on the first two stages of 
information processing: supply and prioritization.  The next step is to look at how the 
information that is prioritized, testimony at committee hearings, is applied to the policy 
making process.  The pluralistic theory of information suggests that congressional 
committees use the information they receive from subsystems to help define problems 
(Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  These problem definitions would then 
be reflected in committees’ markups and amendments to legislation.   
One way to test whether prioritization helps shape problem definitions used in 
legislation is by comparing witness testimony at referral hearings to committee markups 
and committee amendments.  A plagiarism predictor model, similar to those used to 
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detect cheating on term papers, can determine how much (if any) of the testimony 
predicts the markup or amendment content.  A similar method has been used by 
Wilkerson and colleagues (2015) to show how language from previous failed bills is 
used in later policy making attempts.   
Information Processing at the Individual Level 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore information at the institutional 
level—specifically how congressional committees operate as the information hub of 
subsystems.  Congressional committees prioritize information from subsystem actors 
and broadcast that information to the chamber and broader policy audience.  They also 
deliver messages from the chamber to subsystem actors, especially federal bureaucrats.  
How the institution processes information is very interesting, but also begs the question: 
How does this process work at the individual level? 
Individual members of Congress differ in terms of their ideological preferences 
as well as the preferences of their constituencies and clientele.  While all committee 
members may prefer a type of witness, it is doubtful they share the same preference for 
the specific individuals or messages.  When asked, “Which do you think are more 
effective overall in influencing policy…?”, 54 percent of Republican congressional staff 
answered ideological think tanks (Rich 2004).  Only 27 percent of Republican 
congressional staff rated non-ideological think tanks as more effective.  In comparison, 
Democratic congressional staffers held the opposite views (Rich 2004).  Rich’s (2004) 
study of think tanks provides evidence of different individual preferences for 
information, which suggests this area is ripe for exploration.  
One way to better understand the information process, especially prioritization, 
at the individual level is by looking at the questions committee members ask during 
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committee hearings.  Individuals interested in scientific or technical expertise will ask 
questions to lead the witness in that direction.  Members interested in ideological or 
partisan information will ask questions to lead the witness that way.  By looking at both 
the individual preferences and questions of members of Congress and the possible 
ideological leanings of the witnesses, a better understanding of individual information 
processing in terms of both prioritization and supply can be had.   
These three areas, information search strategies, the effects of testimony on 
policy making, and individual information processing, are all promising for future 
research on information processing.  In addition, there are several additional short term 
projects that can be addressed using the existing data, including whether campaign 
contributions can predict which groups and businesses testify; expanding the detailed 
analysis of energy policy to domestic commerce and health care; which came first: 
subsidies for alternative and renewable energy or information sources representing the 
alternative and renewable energy industry; and what determines when information from 
health practitioners is prioritized or when the information about health finance and 
insurance is prioritized. In short, there are endless ways to use this new approach to 
studying information processing, specifically information prioritization, to gain a better 
understanding of how information from non-elected policy elites affects problem 




APPENDIX A: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES TESTIFYING IN DOMESTIC COMMERCE, 
ENERGY, AND HEALTH CARE 
Table A1: House Committees Testifying in Domestic Commerce, Energy, and Health 
Care by Type, 1995-2010 
 
  
House Committees Committee Type
Number of 
Hearings
Agriculture Committee Constituency 48
Appropriations Committee Power 48
Armed Services Committee Constituency 37
Banking and Financial Services Committee Policy 404
Budget Committee Power 21
Education and the Workforce Committee Policy 47
Energy and Commerce Committee Policy 526
Government Reform and Oversight Committee Policy 374
International Relations Committee Policy 33
Judiciary Committee Power* 260
Resources Committee Constituency 75
Rules Committee Power 1
Science Committee Constituency 154
Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming Policy** 33
Select Committee on Homeland Security Constituency*** 52
Small Business Committee Constituency 414
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Constituency 79
Veteran's Affairs Committee Constituency 178
Ways and Means Committee Power 184
Total 2968
*Deering and Smith (1997) identify the House Judiciary Committee as a policy committee.  Here it 
is coded as a power committee given how prominent it has become in modern politics.
**Committee did not exist for the Deering and Smith (1997) study.  Coded as a policy committee 
here given it directly looks at two very polarizing issues.
***Committee did not exist for the Deering and Smith (1997) study.  Coded as a constituency 
committee given much of these policies allow members to send funding and equipment to their 
districts.
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Table A2: Senate Committees Testifying in Domestic Commerce, Energy, and Health 
Care by Type, 1995-2010 
 
 
Senate Committees Committee Type
Number of 
Hearings
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee Constituency 37
Appropriations Committee Power* 124
Armed Services Committee Constituency** 12
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Policy# 196
Budget Committee Policy 4
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Constituency 121
Democratic Policy Council Policy## 5
Energy and Natural Resources Committee Constituency 191
Environment and Public Works Committee Constituency 35
Finance Committee Constituency** 144
Foreign Relations Committee Policy 19
Governmental Affairs Committee Policy 181
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee Policy 188
Judiciary Committee Power### 172
Permanent Select Committee on Indian Affairs Constituency*** 7
Small Business Committee Constituency** 100
Special Committee on Aging Constituency*** 175
Veteran's Affairs Committee Constituency*** 66
Total 1777
#Committee coded as mixed by the Deering and Smith (1997).  Coded as policy here given that 
banking and housing have become much more divisive issues.
##Committee was not coded by the Deering and Smith (1997) study. This committee is a venue for 
policy making for Senate Democrats.
###Deering and Smith (1997) identify the House Judiciary Committee as a policy committee.  Here 
it is coded as a power committee given how prominent it has become in modern politics.
*Coded as a constituency committee by Deering and Smith (1997).  Here coded as power given the 
control this committee has over funding now that earmarks are so much less common.  
**Committee coded as mixed by the Deering and Smith (1997) study.  Coded as a constituency 
committee here given much of these policies allow members to send funding  or other benefits to 
their districts.
***Committee did not exist or was not coded for the Deering and Smith (1997) study.  Coded as a 
constituency committee given much of these policies allow members to send funding and equipment 
to their districts.
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APPENDIX B: DOMESTIC COMMERCE, ENERGY, AND HEALTH CARE POLICY AREAS 
Table B1: Domestic Commerce, Energy, and Health Care Policy Areas According to the 
Policy Agendas Project’s Content Coding Scheme 
 
 The Policy Agendas Project has a content coding scheme that is both consistent 
over time and across institutions.  For more information on the coding scheme, please 
• General • General • General
•
Nuclear Energy and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Issues
•
U.S. Banking System and Financial 
Institution Regulation
•
Comprehensive Health Care 
Reform
• Electricity and Hydroelectricity •
Securities and Commodities 
Regulation
•
Insurance Reform, Availiablity, 
and Cost
• Natural Gas and Oil •
Consumer Finance, Mortgages, 
and Credit Cards
•
Regulation of Drug Industry, 
Medical Devices, and Clinical 
Labs
• Coal • Insurance Regulation •
Facilities Construction, 
regulation, and payments
• Alternative and Renewable Energy • Bankruptcy •
Provider and insurer payment and 
regulation
• Energy Conservation •
Corporate Mergers, Antitrust 
Regulation, and Corporate 
Management Issues
• Medical liability, fraud and abuse
• Research and Development •
Small Business Issues and the 
Small Business Administration
• Health Manpower and Training
• Other • Copyrights and Patents •
Prevention, communicable 
diseases and health promotion
• Domestic Disaster Relief • Infants and children
• Tourism •
Mental illness and mental 
retardation
•
Consumer Safety and Consumer 
Fraud
•
Long-term care, home health, 
terminally ill, and rehabilitation 
services
• Sports and Gambling Regulation •
Prescription drug coverage and 
costs
• Other •
Other or multiple benefits and 
procedures
•
Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, and 
Education
•
Alcohol/Controlled and Illegal 
Drug Abuse, Treatment, and 
Education
• Research and development
• Other
Energy




visit www.policyagendas.org.  The Policy Agendas’ data used here were originally 
collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National 
Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed 
through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither 






APPENDIX C: WITNESSES TESTIFYING AT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS 
ON DOMESTIC COMMERCE, ENERGY, AND HEALTH CARE, 1995-2010 
Table C1: Coding Scheme for Witnesses Testifying at Congressional Committee 
Hearings 
 
Witness Affiliation Example Notes
Public Institutions
Hospitals Brackenridge Hospital 
Military and university medical centers are coded as 201 and 
203, respectively; private hospitals are coded as 101-1.
Schools
The University of Texas, 
Austin
Universities (public and private) and primary and secondary 
schools. Organizations representing school districts are coded as 
government if elected or as interest groups if they are nonprofit
Government
Federal bureaucracies Department of Defense
This includes those organizations that are chartered by the U.S. 
Congress, including research programs, labs, and other programs 
that are not necessarily federal agencies. Also, includes va 
hospitals. Those witnesses identified as "former bureaucrat" 
were coded as bureaucrat and former.
Members (and former 
members) of Congress
Harry Reid
Current and former Members of the U.S. Congress; former 
members of Congress only included here when they have no other 
affiliation.
State and Local 
Governments 
TX Department of 
Agriculture
State and local governments, elected officials and bureaucrats.  
This includes organizations that represent state and local 
governments as well as water, power, and port authorities 
chartered by states and localities.
Businesses
Large businesses Wal-Mart Having at least 1,000 employees
Small businesses Molecular Imprints
Having less than 1,000 employees and those where no number of 
employees was found. 
Other
Those business that were unidentifiable, usually had gone out of 
business in the mid-1990s.
Interest Groups
Nonprofit and citizen 
groups
Alzheimer's Foundation of 
America
Interest groups open membership and think tanks, covers multiple 
sectors/categories of organizations. Not-for-profits and 
nonprofits that operate as businesses are coded here (ex. 
investment orgs for research).
Trade Associations
U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce
Those organizations that represent entire industries, even if they 






Those organizations that represent professional groups even if 
they are not officially considered professional associations.
Unions United Steelworkers Unions
Other Those organizations with unidentifiable statements of purpose
Other
Individuals Victim of car crash If "representing", put in in a more specific category.
Native Americans Native American tribes, businesses, or organizations.
Foreign Countries Foreign Countries International organizations or foreign governments.
Other
Unidentified or no 
affiliation
Individuals or those with no affiliation. 
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 The witnesses were coded according to which primary agency, organization, or 
institution they were representing at a given hearing.  Some witnesses are identified by a 
primary institutional (ex. a business) as well as several additional organizations (ex. 
trade or professional associations).  Witnesses were always coded according to their 
primary institution, disregarding additional information.  The only exception to this rule 
was for the ‘other’ category.  If a witness was identified primarily as a farmer who was 
also representing a professional farmers association, he or she would have been coded 
by that professional association given the uninformative nature of the ‘other’ category. 
These exceptions were few and far between.   
 For more information about how businesses were coded for industry, see the 
discussion in Chapter Five.  For a more detailed discussion on how bureaucrats were 
coded by appointment and type, see Chapters Four and Six, respectively.  
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APPENDIX D: PROBLEM UNCERTAINTY CALCULATED BY THE HERFINDAHL-
HIRSCHMAN INDEX 
Below is an example for how problem uncertainty was calculated using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  A problem uncertainty score (the inverse of the 
HHI) was created for each committee holding hearings in domestic commerce, energy, 
and health care policy areas from 1995 to 2010.  The four steps for calculating problem 
uncertainty for a given committee in a given month is shown below.  The following 
steps was repeated for each committee, for each month in this dataset.  
To calculate problem uncertainty for Committee 1 in Month 1, all hearings held 
by Committee 1 in all policy areas was identified using the Policy Agendas Projects’ 
Congressional Hearings Dataset.  For each Policy Agendas Topic Number (n=20), the 








Proportion of Hearings Held by 









 Next, for each Policy Agendas Topic Number, the proportion of hearings held by 
Committee 1 in Month 1 was squared. See Step 2 below. 
 
 
 Third, the squared proportions of hearings held by Committee 1 in Month 1 are 
summed to create the HHI for Committee 1, Month 1.  See Step 3 below. 
 
 
 Last, the problem uncertainty measure is found by calculating 1 minus the HHI 
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Proportion of Hearings Held by 










1-HHI= Uncertainty for Committee 1, Month 1
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 All four steps are repeated for Committee 1 for the rest of the months in this 
dataset (1995-2010).  Then this process is repeated for Committees 2-N.  The result is 
that each committee has a problem uncertainty score for each month during this time 
frame.   
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APPENDIX E: FINDINGS FOR CHAPTERS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX 
Table E1: Negative Binomial Models: The Number of Bureaucrats and Careerist 
Bureaucrats Testifying at Committee Hearings, 1995-2010 
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Table E2: Negative Binomial Models: The Number of Businesses and Interest Groups 




Table E3: Negative Binomial Models: The Number of Bureaucrats and States and 
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